Bishop Berkeley's philosophical battle was against the growing materialistic mindset of the Enlightenment. He challenged the ideas of thinkers like John Locke, who believed in indirect realism, the notion that we perceive the world through our senses but that these senses might not reflect reality accurately. Berkeley argued for a different perspective called subjective immaterialism, suggesting that objects only exist because they are perceived by God. This idea laid the foundation for what would later be known as phenomenalism, which emphasises that our experiences shape our understanding of reality.
Berkeley published Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, where he introduced the concept of Immaterialism, later called Idealism. In the dialogues, Philonous represents Berkeley's ideas against Hylas's scepticism by promoting an immaterialist viewpoint, asserting that the true nature of things lies in their perception, which depends on divine perception.
Context
Opposition to Locke
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) argued that there are no mind-independent objects in the way that John Locke described. The immediate objects of perception (tables, chairs, etc.) are mind-dependent objects. This idea is called Immaterialism. Later it was called Idealism.
Berkeley attacks Locke’s indirect realism arguing that his notion of substance could not cause ideas since they are too different. Locke maintains that substance must be unchanging and fixed, yet perceptions are ‘fleeting and variable’. If Locke’s representational causal theory of perception were true, it could never be known to be true, since you cannot correlate impressions or ideas with the qualities of which they are impressions or ideas to offer inductive confirmation to the supposed causal connection. Locke's view may be the best explanation, but can never be confirmed or disconfirmed in experience.
According to Locke the primary qualities of an object, such as the solidity and occupation of space exist, independently of the perceiver. The secondary ones, like the colour, differ according to what he perceives. Our senses capture the primary qualities of size and shape, but our ideas of secondary qualities (colour, odour etc...) are a mismatch. Nothing in the outside world is exactly captured in our sensations. He offers a thought experiment to show that secondary qualities are perceptions and not objects in themselves. Almonds have neither taste nor colour, though we perceive them as sweet and white. When we alter the primary qualities by crushing the almond, the change affects the secondary qualities since they are simply combinations of primary qualities.
Berkeley disagreed with Locke's primary /secondary distinction, saying it was false. He argued that both primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent because they are subject to interpersonal and intrapersonal perceptual variation. In primary qualities objects can appear to have different sizes, shapes, speeds, etc; in secondary qualities objects can appear to have different colours, tastes, etc. He also argued that we cannot imagine primary qualities without secondary ones. You cannot imagine a colourless, tasteless apple. You end up stripping away the apple itself.
Empiricism vs. Rationalism
The Rationalist arguments about perception are found in Descartes. In The Meditations he begins by doubting all of his perceptions, proving his existence with the phrase "I think therefore I am", and then works to the conclusion that perceptions are God-given.
Berkeley took the position that all things that we see have a reality to them and that our perceptions are sufficient to know and understand that because our perceptions are capable of responding to a true reality. Berkeley’s arguments against mind-independent objects remove our reasons to believe that anything other than your personal mind-dependent experience exists. He is accused of solipsism. Berkeley responds by arguing, like Descartes and Malebranche's 'Vision of God', that all of our perceptions originate in the mind of God. He argues this on the premise that, since it can’t be matter that causes our perceptions, it must be a mind and the only mind powerful enough to do this is God’s.
Later, Kant attempted a synthesis of the rationalist and the empiricist positions. His theory utilises the reality of a noumenon, the actual objects that cannot be completely understood, and then a phenomenon, which is human understanding through the mind lens interpreting that noumenon.
Berkeley's argument that mind-independent objects do not exist because it is impossible to conceive of them, has been known since the 1970s as the 'master argument'. It is Berkeley's argument to demonstrate that materialism, or a mind-independent world, is logically impossible. In order to determine whether it is possible for a tree to exist outside of the mind, we need to be able to think of an unconceived tree. But as soon as we try to think about this tree, we have conceived it. So we have failed and there is no good reason to believe that trees exist outside of the mind:
"When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas."
Bertrand Russell was critical of Berkeley's argument because it seemed to depend for its plausibility upon confusing the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension.
Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism is a radical form of empiricism whose roots can be traced back to Berkeley and his subjective idealism. Berkeley claimed that an omniscient God perceived all objects and that this was what kept them in existence.
John Stuart Mill had a theory of perception which is commonly referred to as classical phenomenalism and differs from Berkeley's idealism. Contrary to Berkeley's 'divine perception', Mill claimed that permanent possibilities of experience were sufficient for an object's existence. These permanent possibilities could be analysed into counterfactual conditionals, such as
"... if I were to have y-type sensations, then I would also have x-type sensations".
Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism" is quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version. In Berkeley's view, the so-called "things-in-themselves" do not exist, except as subjectively perceived "bundles of sensations", an idea promoted by Hume.
However, Berkeley insists that these sensations are guaranteed consistency and permanence because they are constantly perceived by the mind of God. On the other hand, Kant holds that objects do not cease to exist when they are no longer perceived by a human subject or mind.
Summary
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and Atheists was published in 1713.
First dialogue
The Dialogues are Socratic-style conversations between two characters, Philonous (representing Berkeley's ideas) and Hylas. They are discussing the nature of reality, especially concerning the existence of material substance and the perception of qualities.
Hylas is concerned about the implications of sceptical philosophies that undermine commonsense truths, leading to possible ignorance about important matters. So he accuses Philonous of suggesting an extreme position that denies the existence of material substance, a notion he finds absurd. Philonous counters that believing in material substance without proper examination may, in fact, lead to greater scepticism. They debate whether denying the existence of something equates to scepticism.
Hylas defines "sensible things" as those directly perceived by the senses, questioning whether causes of sensory perceptions can themselves be perceived. Philonous then leads Hylas in a series of arguments suggesting that what we perceive (heat, taste, etc.) cannot exist without the mind.
They go on to discuss the nature of perception, how qualities (like heat and colour) relate to the objects perceived. Philonous argues that since these qualities are dependent on perception, they cannot logically exist outside of a perceiving mind.
Hylas admits that secondary qualities (like sensation) do not exist independently of the mind. He expresses uncertainty about primary qualities (extension, figure, motion), still maintaining the idea of a material substratum. Philonous challenges this notion with reasoning that ultimately leads Hylas to question the existence of even primary qualities without a perceiving mind.
Second dialogue
The next day Hylas acknowledges that upon reflection, the ideas discussed previously appear clearer and more compelling to him. Philonous suggests that clarity and satisfaction with ideas often indicate truth and alignment with nature and reason.
Hylas then presents a modern explanation of how sensations and ideas arise, positing that nerves transmit impressions from the brain to the soul, producing ideas. Philonous challenges this view, questioning whether the brain exists as a sensible thing and whether one idea can cause another. He argues that all ideas, including those of the brain, exist only in the mind and thus cannot cause other ideas directly. Hylas begins to doubt his hypothesis of a material cause for ideas.
Now Philonous leads Hylas towards recognising that if sensible things depend on being perceived, they cannot have real existence without a perceiver, challenging Hylas’ scepticism about the physical world. Philonous emphasises the beauty and order in nature, arguing against the nihilism that denies reality to the visible world. Philonous concludes that because sensible things depend on perception, they must exist in a greater mind, namely God. Hylas expresses agreement and says that this conclusion aligns with Christian beliefs, but Philonous clarifies that his reasoning is based on the necessity of perception for existence.
Hylas then raises the possibility of matter as an intermediary cause of ideas, but Philonous counters that if matter is defined as whatever is unthinking and inactive, it cannot effectively cause thoughts or ideas. Philonous rebuts the notion of matter as an “instrument” for God, arguing that an omnipotent being does not require tools for action. Hylas agrees but insists that matter might be an “occasion,” which Philonous also challenges.
Throughout the dialogue, Hylas admits his definitions of matter and its existence become more vague, ultimately claiming to understand it as something entirely unknown. Philonous criticises the lack of coherence in Hylas' assertions. By the end of the dialogue, Hylas acknowledges his prior beliefs about matter may have been misguided and expresses a desire to continue the discussion.
Third dialogue
Philonous asks Hylas about the reflections from their previous discussions. Hylas doubts human knowledge, stating that all opinions are uncertain and that they can only know the appearances of things, not their true natures. Hylas argues that while we can perceive qualities of objects, we cannot claim to know their true essence. Philonous counters that our perceptions constitute knowledge of real things, like stones or trees, insisting these perceptions cannot be separated from existence.
Hylas expresses scepticism about the existence of material objects, concluding that they might not exist outside of perception. Philonous critiques Hylas's belief in material substance, arguing it causes confusion and scepticism about the nature of reality. Philonous describes his belief that the real nature of all things is in their perception, promoting an immaterialist viewpoint. Hylas, although initially resistant, acknowledges that he has been misled by the notion of unthinking substances and agrees to engage more with Philonous's perspective.
The conversation moves to the existence of God as the omnipresent mind, asserting that knowledge of spirit must exist as distinct from ideas. Philonous points out the difference between perceivable ideas and the concept of material substance, which is devoid of qualities. He defends the position that philosophy does not need to account for material substance as an external entity, emphasising that all perception is mediated by mind. He urges Hylas to consider the philosophical soundness of beliefs in God and the structure of existence without the need for a material substratum. The dialogue then includes the biblical account of creation to reconcile traditional religious views with immaterialism: Philonous argues that creation does not require an absolute existent realm independent of the divine perception and teaches that things exist in God’s mind.
By the end of the dialogue, Hylas admits he finds more satisfaction in Philonous's arguments and sees the reduction of unnecessary complexities in understanding existence. Philonous encourages Hylas to maintain confidence in sensory experience as the basis for knowing real things, rather than abstract philosophical constructs. The discussion concludes with Hylas recognising the clarity offered through immaterialism and the advantages over scepticism.
Themes
Materialism
Berkeley's aim in the first dialogue is to prove that materialism is false, that is, that we have no reason to believe in the existence of mind-independent material objects. First he attempts to prove that we have no immediate perception of mind-independent material objects, and then that we have no basis on which to infer the existence of mind-independent material objects from our immediate experience. Since Berkeley is an empiricist, establishing that we do not obtain evidence for the existence of mind-independent material objects in either of these two ways, amounts in his eyes to proving that we do not obtain evidence for mind-independent material objects at all. For an empiricist, all knowledge must either come directly through sensory experience or else be inferred based on such experience.
To prove that everything we perceive in our immediate experience is mind-dependent, Berkeley presents two arguments. Grounding both arguments is the seemingly unobjectionable claim that what we immediately perceive of the world are sensible qualities (such as colour, taste, smell, heat, shape, size, and so on). In the first of these arguments, he tries to get us to admit that our experience of the world (at least our experience of colour, taste, sound, heat, and smell, as opposed to size, shape, and motion) fundamentally involves pleasure and pain, and that these sensations cannot exist in material objects.
By connecting all of our sensations of secondary qualities with pleasure and pain, then, he forces us to admit that none of these sensible qualities can exist outside of the mind. Berkeley uses the following line of reasoning. Imagine that you are experiencing intense heat, he asks: How do you experience this? As pain, naturally. But can pain exist in an insentient object? Of course not. So, pain cannot be in material objects; pain can only be in a mind. But if we feel intense heat as pain, that means that intense heat also cannot exist outside of the mind. So intense heat is mind dependent. This means that all heat must be mind-dependent since intense heat is obviously the same kind of thing as all other degrees of heat.
The argument from pleasure and pain only applies to secondary qualities, but Berkeley must also prove that primary qualities are mind-dependent if he is to prove that everything we receive through immediate experience is mind-dependent. His second argument, therefore, applies to primary qualities as well. Here Berkeley points to instances of perceptual relativity, such as the fact that colours can look different in varied lighting conditions or that a piece of wheat can be big to a mouse and small to a human.
Given that we have these highly variable experiences of both primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley concludes that what we are experiencing cannot be anything mind-independent. After all, material objects are supposed to be stable things, and if they are not changing constantly, then they cannot be what we are experiencing as changing so frequently. With these two arguments, Berkeley feels he has shown that everything we immediately perceive (i.e. all sensible qualities) is mind-dependent. In other words, he thinks he has shown that we get no evidence of mind-independent material objects from our immediate experience.
If we do have any evidence for the existence of mind-independent material objects, then this must come from some sort of inference that we make based on our immediate experience. Berkeley's next task, therefore, is to show that no such inference is warranted. He shows, first, that we cannot infer the existence of matter as some sort of support for sensible qualities (i.e. as a substratum), because this notion is incoherent; next he shows that the idea of material objects as the archetypes for our ideas is equally incoherent. He does the same for the thesis that material objects are the cause of our ideas. Since he believes that these are the only three inferences one might make, once he has shown that these are unwarranted, he believes that he has conclusively shown that we have no evidence at all for the existence of mind-independent material objects.
Ideas as real things
Berkeley thinks that there are only two sorts of things in the world: ideas and the minds that have them. This does not mean, however, that he thinks that all of reality is just a subjective figment of our imaginations. He believes firmly in the existence of a "real world." He just thinks that this real world is made up entirely of ideas.
Specifically, real things are collections of sensations. We can distinguish real things from our other ideas (such as the products of our imagination and memory) because they are more vivid, and they are involuntary. In other words, we can tell which ideas are real things by telling which of our ideas are sensory perceptions.
Berkeley's theory that real things are just collections of sensations is often summed up by the Latin phrase, "Esse est percipi," which means "to be is to be perceived." This is another way of saying that real things are mind-dependent, or that they are ideas.
Scepticism
By making real things into ideas, Berkeley thinks that he has posited a world system that is immune to scepticism. Scepticism infiltrates a system in two ways: it raises doubts about whether anything really exists, and it raises doubts about whether appearances adhere to reality. Neither of these doubts can be raised in Berkeley's theory. Since real things are just sensations, once you have a sensation of a tree, it is a contradiction to doubt that the tree exists. The tree is just the sensation, and you cannot doubt that you had that.
In addition, there is no room for wondering whether the tree is really like it appears to you. There is nothing to the tree other than your sensation of it. There can be, therefore, no distinction between appearance and reality.
Atheism
To combat atheism, Berkeley set God up in a crucial central role, controlling and maintaining the whole idealist system.
Though Berkeley thinks that sensible objects are mind-dependent, he does not think that they depend for their existence on his mind or your mind or any human mind. Instead, he thinks that they all depend for their existence on God's mind. God brings things into existence by conceiving of them and maintains their existence by continuing to conceive of them. God is the ultimate perceiver. From time to time God also allows us to perceive these ideas in certain fixed patterns which we call "laws of nature." For instance, whenever He allows us to have the sensation "seeing fire," he accompanies it with the sensation "feeling heat." He does the same with the sensations "seeing snow" and "feeling cold," and so on.
Berkeley is certain that God must be the cause of all of our sensations, because he notices that these sensations are involuntary. While he can choose to conjure up an image of a watermelon in his imagination, he cannot just choose to see a watermelon with his eyes. There is something else out there that causes him to either see a watermelon or not see a watermelon, regardless of his own will. While most people would say that what is out there determining his sensation is a mind-independent material object (a material watermelon), Berkeley knows this cannot be the case because he has already shown that there is no reason to believe there are mind-independent material objects. Instead, he concludes that it is God who is causing his sensation. God, he reasons, must contain all ideas inside of Him and allow us to have access to them now and then, in certain patterns.
Positing God as the ultimate backup perceiver means that real objects do not flicker in and out of existence depending on whether any human being is perceiving them. A tree deep in an uninhabited forest exists just as truly and constantly as a tree in a suburban park. For a real object to exist, it must simply be perceived by God.
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