Abstract
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's book "The Social Construction of Reality" explores the constant creation of knowledge in social interactions. It argues that reality is created through social processes. People produce and maintain a shared sense of what is real via interaction, language, institutions, and routines. Knowledge and “truth” are therefore historically and socially contextual, rather than objective or given.
Context
Philosophical background
Immanuel Kant
Some of Kant's predecessors had speculated on the reality we perceive: whether it exists exactly as we perceive it, whether our sensory perceptions are but a minute aspect of this reality, whether this reality is actually only a figment of our imagination or whether this imagination is only one imagination and all the other people in it are imagined. This is solipsism.
Kant (1724–1804) asked what it actually is that our consciousness has to have before it ever has a perception whatsoever and what our mind therefore lays over the experiences we make in and with the world, while accepting that there is a world that affects us. In short, the things that make the world outside of our mind are things-in-themselves that affect us. To make sense of the world so we can act in it, the mind brings to experiences certain things that Kant calls transcendental or a priori. Most important of these are the concepts of time and space.
The concepts our mind uses to have thoughts of the world and to find direction and orientation in it are therefore not fixed or identical with the things-in-themselves. Therefore, there really is no concept of a truth that is really certain. Some things we have to postulate and just take at face value.
So how do we gain any kind of certainty at all? Understanding, reason, and judgement are the tools we have for the task of making use of concepts. And we also know that there must be others like us, entities with minds of their own, each of whom has his or her own way to find certainty. They and their actions become the touchstone for our judgements and our concepts about the world. We act with others and try out our concepts and judgements to find out if they match with those of others. Reason is therefore a public affair. A century after Kant, scholars study this question in much more detail under the term “communication.”
Schopenhauer
Many developments in science and philosophy have followed in the wake of Kant. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) published his seminal The World as Will and Representation in 1818–19. For the most part, he accepted Kant's central distinction of phenomena (that which is perceived) and noumena (that which is thought of). He introduced the concept of Will to bridge the gap from the side of the noumena. The world is therefore willed as a representation for the one who perceives. The phenomena are not independent of that consciousness.
Husserl
Another version of this distinction was created by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl founded the philosophical discipline of phenomenology. According to Husserl, by "bracketing" away (epoché) the assumptions we hold in regard to the external world when viewing a phenomenon, we can actually reach the essence of this phenomenon. The consciousness as an act and the direction of the objects are two different things. There is no thought that is not directed, that does not have intentionality. Therefore, our directedness to the object in intentionality also constitutes it. This speculation led Husserl to another question: what happens when several people refer to an object in communication, what is the "I" to which they are referring, if each subjective mind has its own intentionality and constitutes the object for each person in his or her own way? In the study of communication, this is the problem of intersubjectivity.
Schütz
Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) studied law and worked most of his life as a banker. He can be considered the founder of phenomenological sociology. In his native Austria, Schütz easily gained access to the academic world of Vienna. His emigration to the US in 1938 denied him the same kind of access that he had had in Europe for quite a long time. The philosophical world of the US was long in the process of turning away from idealist and speculative thought and toward British logic and language philosophy, represented by Bertrand Russell and, later, Quine. US sociology was dominated in the 1940s and 1950s by Talcott Parsons' effort to create a common conceptual frame for the fragmented social sciences, which was dubbed structural-functionalism, or social systems theory. Schütz tried to gain Parsons' attention, which made sense in so far as both thought of "social action" as a central concept of theory and both were deeply influenced by the work of Max Weber. But their correspondence was short-lived to the regret of Schütz, since Parsons had little use for what he called "contemplative philosophy." Parsons was trained in philosophical thinking, economics, and biology, but he was fascinated by conceptual frames that could actually be put to pragmatic use and did not remain mere speculative thought.
Following in Schütz's footsteps, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann published The Social Construction of Reality in 1966. Focusing on a perspective of the sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann assume a constant process of creation of knowledge occurring in the interactions of people. This body of knowledge, thus continuously created, becomes socially accepted as a shared reality that the actors experience as both subjectively meaningful and objectively factual.
The History of 'Social Constructivism'
The "social constructions" Berger and Luckmann were talking about were like Durkheim's social facts, devoid of the subjectivity that later generations would associate with “social construction.” For this reason, some authors distinguish among multiple strands of social constructivism, each with their own concept of construction.
It is notable that the phrase “social construction” was hardly used before 1966, but quickly rose to prominence after the publication of this book, especially in the 1980s. Although this effect cannot be attributed uniquely to Bergman and Luckmann, they seem to have triggered the phrase’s ascendancy in the 1970s. By the end of that decade, the book had been cited hundreds of times. Importantly, however, few of the studies that mentioned it in their footnotes showed much affinity with the book’s phenomenological agenda. They quoted it, but not necessarily to endorse its approach.
US Sociology in the 1960s
The two reigning paradigms in the USA field of 60s sociology were structural functionalism as advocated by Talcott Parsons and quantitative research in the tradition of methodological positivism. However, there was a widely shared sense in the late 1960s that Parsonianism and positivism did not exhaust the realm of possibilities. The Social Construction of Reality was welcomed as part of an insurgency against mainstream sociology.
Berger and Luckmann’s enthusiasm for the present state of sociological theory was, in their own words, “markedly restrained". The manifesto tone of their treatise conveyed a commitment to a different type of sociology: more phenomenological than positivist, more interpretative than quantitative, and more European than USA. In practice, however, such an alternative hardly got off the ground.
As reviewers pointed out, Berger and Luckmann's concern was with “reality maintenance”, not the dynamics of disruption, uncertainty, or change. Writing from Berkeley, where posters of Che Guevara hanging in faculty offices expressed the reigning political mood, Ivan H. Light criticised the book’s “conservative implications", evidenced by its lack of appreciation of “the creative potential of disorder, unrest, and mass uncertainty".
The Authors’ Intellectual Influences
The Social Construction of Reality continued work that the authors had done before, both collectively and individually. Berger and Luckmann’s shared fascination with the sociology of religion is another relevant context, especially since their collaboration did not prevent them from adopting very different definitions of religion. The book can be read against the background of Berger’s Invitation to Sociology (1963), which anticipated this book by presenting “reality,” in quotation marks, as a socially constructed world upheld by an immense apparatus of ‘bad faith’ consisting of social roles, codes, and expectations.
Berger’s theological writings from the early 1960s have also influenced The Social Construction of Reality. Berger, in Weberian fashion, tried to separate his theological musings from his sociological theorising. Also, his theological orientation was broadly “neo-orthodox", judging by his approval of theologists such as Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who provided theological ammunition for Berger’s assault on religious conformism.
In The Precarious Vision (1961), Berger offered a theological critique of the social imagination of mainstream Christianity. Following Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth, who had sharply differentiated between Christian faith and middle-class religiosity, the book claimed that much of what passes for Christianity is a travesty of the faith insofar as its traditions, moral codes, and social expectations take the place of what Berger called the all-decisive encounter of sinful humans with “the revelation of God in Jesus Christ". If that existential encounter is what matters, then there are theological reasons for unmasking religious traditions as “idols". This suspicion of bad faith explains why Berger was prepared to compare society to “a bag of tricks”, or a “puppet theatre". More specifically, it explains why he welcomed a sociological unmasking of all social imageries that fail to acknowledge humans’ ultimate dependence on God.
Reading The Social Construction of Reality against the background of The Precarious Vision is illuminating insofar as it reveals that Berger had a long-standing interest in “denaturalising” worldviews, invented traditions, and social imaginaries. If his 1961 book still placed these “social illusions” under theological criticism, this book treated them with greater detachment as fictions inherent to creating and maintaining social order. What remained was the consistency with which Berger brought out the “fictitiousness by which the status quo rationalises and maintains itself".
The New School for Social Research
Berger and Luckmann met as students in a philosophy class by Karl Löwith, became inspired by Alfred Schütz’s phenomenology, worked as assistants to sociologist of religion Carl Mayer, and, in the mid-1960s, wrote The Social Construction of Reality. It is a manifesto of authors who, in line with classic New School ideals of social research, conceived of themselves as broadly orientated scholars more than disciplinary specialists, using social theory not as a research methodology but as an idiom for addressing big themes.
What the authors wanted to show is that “everyday reality” is a social construct, which requires care and maintenance to stay in place. Although the reality that we take for granted may seem objectively given, it is “given” only in the sense that it precedes our individual experience and action. Similarly, it is “objective” only in our perception, thanks to a successful objectification of social imageries that makes us accept these imageries as real. Berger and Luckmann wanted to draw attention to the “conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance” that make us experience our social world as “a comprehensive and given reality confronting the individual in a manner analogous to the reality of the natural world.” The book described these machineries with a range of process terms — typification, objectification, sedimentation, institutionalisation, socialisation— thereby offering a conceptual framework for empirical studies of “reality construction” the authors hoped to see emerge. They claimed that if sociologists of knowledge devoted themselves to everything that passes for ‘knowledge’ in society, their branch of study would move from the periphery to the very center of sociological theory.
Summary (1966 edition)
Preface
Berger explains why he and Luckmann wrote the book: to show how people create the world of everyday life through interaction. He says they will use ideas from phenomenology to study ordinary knowledge, language, and routines.
They also focus on how institutions and legitimacy make these human-made meanings seem like natural facts.
Introduction
The authors state the main idea: reality is created through social processes of externalisation, objectivation, and internalisation. They introduce key terms: typification, habitualisation, reification, and outline how personal actions become stable social structures.
They place the argument in a social and philosophical context and promise to link everyday interactions to large institutions.
Chapter 1 — Society as objective reality
This chapter says society is something people create that then feels real and outside of individuals. Repeated actions and roles become facts that guide behaviour.
These objectified features show up as rules, roles, and routines people follow without thinking.
Chapter 2 — Society as a subjective reality
Here they explain how people learn and accept the social world inside their minds. Primary socialisation (childhood) shapes basic beliefs and identity; secondary socialisation (school, work) adds role-specific skills.
Internalised knowledge lets people act within society without constantly rebuilding meaning.
Chapter 3 — The reality of everyday life
The everyday world is familiar and taken for granted. Routine interactions, shared assumptions, and typifications let people cooperate smoothly.
When routines break (through crises or surprises), people notice that reality is constructed and may need to rethink it.
Chapter 4 — Language and society
Language is how people share and preserve meanings. Names, stories and descriptions turn private experiences into public facts.
Written laws, rituals, and texts help lock these meanings into institutions.
Chapter 5 — Society as a human product
People create culture, tools, and practices by acting together (externalisation). When actions repeat, they become habits and routines (habitualisation).
These routines turn into social “things” that seem to exist on their own (objectification).
Chapter 6 — Institutions and the institutional order
Institutions are stable patterns of action, like family, schools, or government, built from repeated roles and rules. They make life predictable by setting expectations.
Institutions stay alive through routines, rules, and ceremonies, but they can change if their authority fades or they fail.
Chapter 7 — The institutionalisation of society
Different institutions connect and shape the larger social system. Specialisation creates separate spheres (work, family, law) but they must also fit together.
Social control and shared meanings help hold the system together and give institutions legitimacy.
Chapter 8 — The social construction of reality and the sociology of knowledge
Knowledge comes from social life and is shaped by institutions. Facts and truths are built and accepted through social processes, not just by observing nature.
Power matters: groups with more influence help decide which knowledge becomes accepted.
Chapter 9 — The institutionalisation of knowledge
Knowledge is formalised through schools, professions, and organisations. These institutions teach, certify, and spread certain ways of thinking.
Institutional backing makes knowledge seem official and objective while other views can be pushed aside.
Chapter 10 — Change and deconstruction
Because reality is built by people, it can be changed. Crises, social movements, new ideas, or questioning routines can lead to change.
The book closes by stressing that people make institutions and institutions shape people—both can be transformed over time.
Themes
Socially Constructed Reality
At the core of social constructionism is the idea that reality is not inherent or objective but is instead socially constructed through human interaction and discourse. This means that what we perceive as real or true is shaped by cultural beliefs, language, and social norms rather than being an accurate reflection of an objective reality. For example, concepts like race, gender, and nationality are not fixed or natural categories but are socially constructed through shared meanings and practices within societies.
Understanding reality as socially constructed challenges essentialist views that assume certain categories or identities have inherent qualities. Instead, social constructionism highlights the context-dependent nature of reality, emphasising the role of social processes in shaping our understanding of the world.
By examining the intersections of language, power and social hierarchies, social constructionism provides a critical lens through which to understand the construction of social reality and to criticise systems of oppression and privilege within society.
Language and Discourse
Language plays a crucial role in the process of social construction by mediating our interactions and shaping how we make sense of the world. Social constructionists argue that language not only reflects but also actively constructs social reality by influencing how we perceive, categorise, and interpret our experiences.
Discourse, or the ways in which language is used to convey meaning within specific social contexts, is central to social constructionism. Discourses are not simply neutral representations of reality but are imbued with power dynamics and cultural meanings that shape our understanding of social phenomena. For example, the language used to describe mental illness or criminal behaviour can influence public perceptions and policy responses, highlighting the role of discourse in constructing social reality.
Power and Social Hierarchies
Power dynamics and social hierarchies are integral to the process of social construction, as they shape whose perspectives and experiences are privileged or marginalised within society. Social constructionists emphasise the ways in which power operates through discourse, institutions, and everyday interactions to produce and reproduce social inequalities.
Dominant groups within society often have the power to define and legitimise certain understandings of reality while marginalising alternative perspectives. This can result in the perpetuation of social hierarchies based on factors such as race, gender, class, and sexuality. Social constructionists analyse how dominant discourses and ideologies maintain and reinforce existing power structures, as well as how marginalised groups resist and challenge these narratives.
Construction of Knowledge and Meaning
Social constructionism challenges the notion of knowledge as objective and fixed, instead emphasising its socially contingent nature. Knowledge is not discovered but constructed through social interactions, cultural practices, and historical contexts. For example, scientific knowledge is not a direct reflection of an objective reality but is shaped by the social context in which it is produced, including the values, interests, and power dynamics of the scientific community.
Meaning is similarly constructed through social processes, as individuals and groups negotiate shared understandings of symbols, signs, and cultural practices. Language plays a crucial role in this process, as it mediates communication and shapes how we interpret and assign meaning to our experiences. Social constructionists analyse how meanings are constructed, contested, and transformed within specific social contexts, highlighting the dynamic and contingent nature of social reality.
Social Construction of Identities and Categories
Identity formation is a central focus of social constructionist inquiry, as identities are not fixed or predetermined but are socially constructed through ongoing processes of negotiation and interaction. For example, gender identity is not determined solely by biological sex but is shaped by cultural norms, expectations, and socialisation practices. Similarly, racial categories are not based on biological differences but are socially constructed through historical processes of colonisation, slavery, and racialisation.
Social constructionists examine how these categories are constructed, maintained, and challenged within different cultural and historical contexts, highlighting the fluid and contingent nature of identity formation. By deconstructing fixed categories and binaries, social constructionism opens up space for alternative understandings of identity that recognise the complexity and diversity of human experience.
Influence of Cultural Context and Historical Perspectives
The process of social construction is deeply influenced by cultural norms, historical legacies, and institutional structures. Different societies and historical periods construct reality in distinct ways, leading to variations in social practices, beliefs, and values. Social constructionists explore how cultural context and historical perspectives shape the construction of reality, as well as how changes in social, political, and economic conditions impact the dynamics of social construction. For example, the construction of gender roles and norms varies across cultures and historical periods, reflecting changing social, economic, and ideological factors. Similarly, the meaning of race and ethnicity is shaped by colonial histories, immigration patterns, and systems of racial classification.
Essentialism vs. Social Constructionism
One criticism of social constructionism is that it is often accused of falling into the trap of "social determinism", whereby everything is seen as socially constructed and individual agency is diminished. Critics argue that essentialist perspectives, which posit that certain characteristics or categories are inherent or natural, offer a more nuanced understanding of human experience. However, social constructionists counter that essentialist views ignore the role of social processes and historical contingencies in shaping reality.
Challenges to Objectivity and Truth
Social constructionism challenges traditional notions of objectivity and truth by highlighting the subjectivity inherent in knowledge production. Critics argue that this relativistic stance undermines the validity of scientific inquiry and moral judgements. However, social constructionists contend that acknowledging the socially constructed nature of knowledge does not negate its usefulness or validity but rather opens up space for critical reflection and interrogation of dominant discourses.
Intersectionality and Complexity in Social Construction
Another criticism of social constructionism is its tendency to overlook the intersecting dynamics of power and identity. Critics argue that focusing solely on social construction can obscure the ways in which multiple axes of oppression, such as race, class, gender, and sexuality, intersect. Social constructionists respond by advocating for an intersectional approach that recognises the complexity of social life and the interconnected nature of systems of oppression and privilege.
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