Abstract
Johann Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre aimed to provide the foundation for all human knowledge through his epistemology. Fichte's work contributed to German Idealism, clarifying distinctions between idealism and dogmatism, emphasising human freedom, and expanding on Kant's ideas, though with differing views. Fichte's philosophy also addressed scepticism, dogmatism, and dialectics, exploring the notions of scientific character and the role of reason.
Context
Johann Fichte's Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (Foundations of the Science of Knowledge), which he wrote from his teaching notes at Jena University, was published between 1794 and 1795. He continued to update it until his death in 1814.
In German Wissenschaft is science and Lehre is doctrine, so Wissenscahftslehre is the Doctrine of Science. However, Fichte’s use of the word science does not refer to the physical sciences of physics, chemistry and biology but to science as the project of knowledge itself. Fichte’s project is to lay the foundation for all of human knowledge, a new epistemology.
In 1792 Fichte wrote an essay entitled Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, criticising religious revelation. Kant read it and had it published by his own publishers. Readers thought it was Kant who had written it and when he told the world that the actual author was Fichte, it launched Fichte’s career as a public intellectual.
In 1793 Fichte received the offer of a teaching position in Critical Philosophy at the University of Jena, following Reinhold, who had initiatited kantian studies there in 1787. Fichte was later followed in the university post by Schelling in 1798 then Hegel in 1801.
Fichte wrote a pamphlet to inform students about what he was going to teach at Jena: Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre. As he was delivering the lectures, he was also at the same time writing the notes, which later became Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. His aim was to ground Kant’s critical philosophy. The task was to discover a single, self-evident starting point or first principle from which one could then somehow “derive” both a theoretical and practical epistemology, explaining our experience of ourselves as finite knowers. Not only would such a strategy guarantee the systematic unity of philosophy itself, but, more importantly, it would also display what Kant hinted at, but never demonstrated: the underlying unity of reason itself.
In terms of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, Fichte is a foundationalist. Foundationalism is the most common conception, where knowledge is built up through an architectural metaphor from foundational principles, the way a building is built up on its foundations. This concept comes from the ancient Greeks when the presocratic philosophers were struggling against the traditional interpretation of nature (physis) which attributed natural events to the works of unpredictable gods. Thales came up with water, Anaximander with the indeterminate (apeiron), Anaximenes with air, and Heraclitus with flux.
In the 17th century René Descartes launched the modern epoch, which marks a shift away from theology to scientific rationality. Descartes too was trying to think of a foundational principle to ground all knowledge. His method was to doubt everything, even what his senses are telling him. After discarding what cannot be known for sure, Descartes concluded “cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am). His reasoning was that for someone to be thinking, that someone must first of all exist. Fichte came up with something that is even more fundamental: 'I am'.
Commentary
Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre is based on three fundamental principles, which describe the dynamic relationship between "I" and the world:
- The Thesis: The Principle of Self-Positing
The first principle is that the “I” is an absolute. This means that the self is self-conscious. It is aware of its own existence and acts to assert this existence. This principle establishes the foundation of subjectivity.
Self-consciousness is not merely reflective but is actively productive. Fichte rejects the idea that the self passively reflects on an already existing external world, as traditional epistemology often suggested. Instead, Fichte argues that the self actively creates both the world of experience and the laws of thought that govern it. The self becomes aware of itself through its actions and interactions with the world. This awareness is not static; it evolves through the process of striving and limitation.
This view of the absolute “I” leads to a theory of knowledge in which the knowing subject plays a central and constitutive role. Knowledge is not something that is passively received from the external world, rather it is actively produced through the self’s engagement with the world. In this sense, the self creates the conditions for the possibility of experience itself. This active role of the subject in creating knowledge marks Fichte’s departure from Kant, who maintained a distinction between the world as it is (the noumenon) and the world as we experience it (the phenomenon). Fichte collapses this distinction by arguing that the self creates the world it knows.
- The Antithesis: Principle of Opposition
The second principle is that the “I” assumes a “not-I” in opposition to itself. For the self to be aware of itself, it must distinguish itself from something external. This “not-I” represents the objective world, which is distinct from the subjective “I.” Fichte stresses that this process is necessary for self-consciousness to emerge, as the “I” can only be aware of itself through this contrast with the “not-I.”
The "I" is an active, self-positing entity that asserts its existence and identity. The "not-I" encompasses all external realities, including other individuals and the physical world. The self becomes aware of itself through its interaction with the "not-I." Recognising the "not-I" is essential for ethical development, according to Fichte. The self must acknowledge the existence and rights of others, leading to a moral framework that emphasises mutual recognition and respect.
The relationship between the "I" and the "not-I" is dynamic and dialectical. The self continually engages with the external world, leading to a deeper understanding of both itself and its place in the world. Hegel further developed the concepts of self-consciousness and the dialectical method. However, while Hegel expanded Fichte’s ideas into a more comprehensive system that included the development of history and the objective spirit, Fichte’s focus remained primarily on the individual self and its relation to the world. This emphasis on subjectivity and freedom has had a lasting influence on existentialism, phenomenology, and even modern psychology.
The Synthesis: The Principle of Limitation
The third principle is that the “I” and the “not-I” limit each other. The self recognises that it is not omnipotent since it encounters resistance from the external world. This mutual limitation is essential for the development of knowledge because it is through this interaction that the self learns about both itself and the world. The self’s activity is always constrained by the existence of the “not-I,” but this limitation is also what makes knowledge possible.
Fichte believed that true freedom involves recognising and accepting limitations. The Principle of Limitation suggests that while individuals strive for freedom and self-realisation, they must also acknowledge the constraints imposed by the external world and other individuals. This interplay between freedom and limitation is essential for ethical and moral development. The Principle of Limitation emphasises the importance of recognising the rights and freedoms of others, as the self cannot fully realise its potential without considering the limitations and freedoms of others. This leads to a more communal understanding of ethics, where individual freedom is balanced with social responsibility.
Fichte's ideas on limitation can be seen as a response to the philosophy of Kant. While Kant emphasised the role of the individual in moral reasoning, Fichte expanded on this by integrating the concept of limitation as a necessary condition for self-consciousness and ethical behaviour.
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is not only a theory of knowledge but also a theory of freedom. By asserting itself, the self asserts its own autonomy and freedom. The act of self-positing is, at its core, an expression of the self’s freedom, and this freedom is fundamental to Fichte’s ethical and political thought. According to Fichte, human beings are not merely determined by external forces, they are free agents who create their own reality through their actions. However, this freedom is not arbitrary, it is guided by rational moral laws. For Fichte, the ultimate purpose of human existence is to act freely in accordance with reason. This moral dimension of Fichte’s philosophy is closely tied to his theory of knowledge, as the self’s freedom is what allows it to generate knowledge and to act in the world.
Themes
German Idealism
German idealism can be traced back to the “critical” or “transcendental” idealism of Immanuel Kant. When the controversy arose, Kant had already published the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). However, critics conflated Kant’s “transcendental” idealism with Berkeley’s “dogmatic” idealism. Thus, Kant was erroneously understood to hold that space and time are “not actual” and that the understanding “makes” the objects of our cognition.
Fichte realised this misrepresentation of Kant and sought to clear it up. In his Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, he characterises the sort of philosophy that begins with the pure "I" as “idealism” and that which begins with the thing in itself as “dogmatism.” Since, according to Fichte’s earlier argument in Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, a unified system of philosophy can have one and only one first principle, and since there are only two possible first principles, then it follows that no “mixed” system of idealism/dogmatism is possible. Moreover, since dogmatism, as understood by Fichte, implies a strict form of determinism, whereas idealism is, from the start, committed to the reality of human freedom, it is also practically impossible to reach any sort of compromise between two such radically opposed systems.
Scepticism
The task that Fichte takes on when he undertakes in 1793 to “rebuild everything" means establishing philosophy as a science, that is, a discipline capable of justifying its claim to validity. It is this term: “science”, that gives coherence to the philosophy of Fichte's work. The question of scientific character is always highlighted by Fichte as the line marking the difference between his philosophy and that of Kant. However, most importantly, this question of scientific character acquires a particular aspect: to attain the status of a science means to develop a particular type of reasoning. Fichte’s use of the word science does not refer to the physical sciences of physics, chemistry and biology but science as the project of knowledge itself. Fichte’s project is to lay the foundation for all of human knowledge, a new epistemology based on Kant.
Dogmatism
For Fichte the only two possible systems of philosophy are dogmatism and idealism. Dogmatism grounds experience upon a thing in itself as the cause of the determinations of the "I"; idealism explains experience as a product of the activity of the "I".
Fichte appears to argue that neither idealism nor dogmatism can directly refute the other and that the choice between them is either radically free or else determined by one's practical interests. Nevertheless he offers a number of arguments designed to refute dogmatism by demonstrating that it can never successfully explain ordinary experience. At the same time, he also tried to explain why the dogmatist remains incapable of recognising the force of such arguments and what this implies concerning the idealist's obligation to educate and to cultivate others.
Fichte’s anti-dogmatism lies in the demand that reason be thoroughly determined from within itself and hence not be determined by anything outside it. It is notable, too, that Fichte was sceptical about the effectiveness of his refutation of dogmatism since the absolute autonomy of reason deprives the idealist of any objective foothold upon which to refute the dogmatist, apart from moral belief.
Dialectics
The "I", in order to think itself as "I", must counterpose itself to its contents/objects. In the thinking of “I am I” we also implicitly think of an object: the “not-I.” This implies that the "I" defines itself with reference to the concept of what it is not! So we have a Thesis: “I= I”, and an Antithesis: “not I.” But the “not I” is not independent of the “I”. It is generated as an act of thought by the power of thinking and as an act of self-limitation. Recognising this, we get a Synthesis of the previous two propositions. “I = I & not-I”.
When we think about this dialectical opposition as the limitation of the "I" by the "not-I", we are practising theoretical philosophy (to claim knowledge of an “object” shapes what we can meaningfully say about it). Where we think about this limitation as the "not-I" being shaped by the activity of the "I" (like an “object”), we are doing practical philosophy (claims about how we ought to act as rational beings). This fills the major gap in Kant’s work: an account of the single unifying principle that Kant needs but disavows. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel believed that Kant assumed these syntheses of subject/object and practical/ theoretical reason, but left them unexplored. His suppositions are thus elucidated by Fichte's dialectics.
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