Abstract
Friedrich Schiller's essay On Grace and Dignity explores morality through Kant's concepts and bridges the gap between morality and aesthetics. Schiller's analysis emphasises the dual nature of humans as rational and emotional beings, highlighting the necessity to balance natural instincts with moral duty. Other philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Bentham offered different perspectives on secular morality.
Context
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) was appointed professor of History and Philosophy at Jena University in 1789 and continued the German idealism studies there, developed from the work of Immanuel Kant. These studies were initiated by Reinhold and prolonged by Fichte, Schiller, Hegel and others. (Jena was renamed Friedrich Schiller University in 1934).
In his famous essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant defines it as “man’s emancipation from his self-imposed immaturity.” What he calls humanity’s “immaturity” is the period when people did not truly think for themselves and instead typically accepted moral rules handed down to them by religion, tradition, or by authorities such as the church, a feudal lord, or the king.
This loss of faith in previously recognised authority was viewed by many as a spiritual crisis for Western civilisation. If God is dead, how do we know what is true and what is right? Kant’s answer was that people simply had to work those things out for themselves. For Kant, morality was not a matter of subjective whim set forth in the name of God or religion or law. He believed that the moral law was something that could only be discovered through reason. It was not something imposed on us from without. Instead, it's a law that we, as rational beings, must impose on ourselves. Some of our deepest feelings are reflected in our reverence for the moral law, and when we act as we do out of a sense of duty, we fulfil ourselves as rational beings.
This new Enlightenment thinking created a problem for moral philosophers: if religion wasn’t the foundation that gave moral beliefs their validity, what other foundation could there be?
One answer to the problem, the Social Contract Theory, was put forward by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who set out different solutions for a secular morality. Hobbes believed in a strong central authority to prevent the chaos of a "war of all against all." Locke emphasised natural rights and the need for government to protect life, liberty, and property. Rousseau focused on the general will and collective sovereignty, advocating for a society that aligns individual freedom with the common good. These differing formulae for a Social Contract stated that morality was essentially a set of rules that human beings agreed upon amongst themselves in order to make living with one another possible. If we didn’t accept these rules, life would be absolutely horrible for everyone.
Another attempt to give morality a non-religious foundation was presented by thinkers like Jeremy Bentham and Francis Hutcheson. Their proposition, Utilitarianism, holds that pleasure and happiness have intrinsic value and actions are morally right if they promote happiness and wrong if they produce pain. This philosophy emphasises maximising pleasure and minimising suffering for the greatest number of people. Something is good if it promotes happiness for the many, and it is bad if it produces suffering for a majority. Our basic duty is to try to do things that add to the amount of happiness and/or reduce the amount of general misery in the world.
Kant discarded Utilitarianism. He thought that the basic problem with it is that it judges actions by their consequences. If your action makes people happy, it’s good; if it does the reverse, it’s bad. But this appears contrary to what we call moral common sense. For example, who is the better person, the millionaire who gives €1,000 to charity in order to score points with his social media following or the minimum-wage worker who donates a day’s pay to charity because she thinks it's her duty to help the needy? If consequences are all that matter, then the millionaire’s action is technically the "better" one. But that’s not how the majority of people would see the situation. Most of us judge actions more for their motivation than by their consequences. Kant believed that in emphasising happiness utilitarianism completely misunderstood the true nature of morality. In his view, the basis for our sense of what is good or bad, right or wrong, is our awareness that human beings are free, rational agents who should be given the respect appropriate to such beings.
Kant’s moral argument is summed up in his sentence:
“The only thing that is unconditionally good is a good will.”
Goodwill, says Kant, is good in all circumstances. A person acts out of goodwill when they do what they do because they think it is their duty, when they act from a sense of moral obligation.
However, we don’t perform every action from a sense of obligation. Much of the time we are acting out of self-interest. Human beings, though, can, and sometimes do, perform an action from purely moral motives. For Kant, when a person freely chooses to do the right thing simply because it is the right thing to do, their action adds value to the world through moral goodness.
According to Kant in most situations duty is obvious. If we're uncertain, we can work out the answer by reflecting on a general principle that Kant calls the “Categorical Imperative.” This, he claims, is the fundamental principle of morality and all other rules and precepts can be deduced from it. He offers several different versions of this rule of reference:
“Act only on that maxim that you can will as a universal law.”
What this means, basically, is that we should only ask ourselves if we sincerely and consistently wish for a world in which everyone behaved in the way we are doing. According to Kant, if our action is morally wrong, the answer to this question would be no.
Another version of the Categorical Imperative that Kant offers states that you should
“...always treat people as ends in themselves, never merely as a means to one’s own ends."
This is commonly referred to as the ends principle. While similar in a way to the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," it puts the onus for following the rule on humans, rather than accepting the strictures of divine influence.
The key to Kant’s belief regarding what makes humans moral beings is the fact that we are free and rational creatures. To treat someone as a means to your own ends or purposes is to not respect this fact about them. Treating someone as an end, by contrast, involves always respecting the fact that they are capable of free rational choices, which may be different from the choices you wish them to make. So if I want you to do something, the only moral course of action is to explain the situation, explain what I want, and let you make your own decision.
Summary
Über Anmut und Würde (On Grace and Dignity) published in 1793, was Friedrich Schiller's commentary on Kant's ideas on morality.
In his essay Schiller uses these concepts to bridge the divide between morality and aesthetics. He confronts a question formulated by Kant: how can duty and inclination combine in our assessment of moral worth?
The essay begins with an analysis of an ancient Greek myth about Venus, the goddess of beauty. Venus has a belt that could impart grace to wearers, even if they themselves were not beautiful. Thus grace is associated with beauty. The belt is a transferable accessory and so the grace it bestows is not part of the wearer’s nature. But it is also objective; it exists whether or not it is being perceived. Since “movement is the only change an object can undergo without altering its identity”, Schiller decides that grace must designate beauty of movement. The Greeks also restricted grace to humans, referring to those capable of moral sentiments, whereas natural objects cannot take credit for their beauty. So, grace implies an expression of human freedom and is an instance of personal merit. According to Schiller, grace is “beauty of form under freedom’s influence”.
Schiller claims that graceful actions present us with a paradox: on the one hand, as instances of freedom they are deliberate movements; on the other hand, they appear to be natural and even instinctive. Schiller resolves this paradox by distinguishing between two kinds of action. Our rational natures allow us to engage in voluntary actions in direct response to our free will. But we also undertake actions that, despite being directed by the will, appear involuntary. These actions Schiller calls sympathetic: they occur due to moral sentiment, as opposed to natural instinct. Acting according to the objectively determined moral law still determines an action’s moral worth, according to Schiller, who describes himself as “completely of one mind with the most rigorous moralists”. But an action can be graceful in addition to being morally worthy if it seems to follow naturally from an agent’s disposition, motivated by feelings that are themselves the product of her character. Grace thus describes the way we act as opposed to the reasons we give for our actions: it is an expression of our “moral attitude”. Being determined in this way by disposition allows an action to appear both necessary and natural to the point that the person does not seem “conscious of possessing grace”.
Schiller calls a person who lives in this state of grace a “beautiful soul”. In such a case, the ethical sense has at last so taken control of all a person’s feelings that it can guide the will without hesitation and is never in danger of standing in contradiction of its decisions. A beautiful soul
“...carries out humankind’s most exacting duties with such ease that they might simply be the actions of its inner instinct."
It can obey reason “with joy”, not treat it as a burden. Thus grace bridges the Kantian divide between inclination and duty:
“It is in a beautiful soul that sensuousness and reason, duty and inclination are in harmony, and grace is their expression as appearance.”
In embodying this kind of perfection, grace provides evidence of a unity of the moral and aesthetic that Kantian philosophy disrupts in the process of making its conceptual distinctions. Once we understand the underlying unity that grace suggests, however, we can correct the excesses brought about by Kant’s rigorous separation of reason and inclination. Schiller considers that in addition to better reflecting metaphysical truth, emphasising the unity of the moral and the aesthetic will produce better results. Brutally suppressing our sensual side will not be successful in the long run.
Although the author describes the beautiful soul as an ideal of human harmony, he acknowledges that circumstances sometimes make that harmony impossible. Because humans are natural creatures, they are susceptible to pleasure and pain. But whereas other animals are motivated solely by this susceptibility, humans in addition have reason. We also have a “suprasensual faculty”, namely the will, which is subject neither to nature nor to reason. This means that while animals must fight to free themselves from pain, humans can decide to hold on to it. When pain threatens to force a human to act against reason, her ethical nature must resist. In such a moment, harmony is impossible and the person cannot achieve moral beauty. But such a moment also creates the possibility of a “moral greatness” that gives “evidence of superiority of the higher faculties over the sensuous”. In refusing to succumb to pain, the beautiful soul becomes heroic and transforms into a sublime soul. The appearance of such a soul is not grace but dignity. Schiller provides the example of someone whose extreme physical pain is evident in his body. By contrast, however, “his intentional movements are gentle, the facial features relaxed, and the eyes and brow serene”. It is this peace, Schiller says, that defines dignity. Here he qualifies his earlier claim that the beautiful soul represented humans’ highest achievement. When grace and dignity are united in the same person, he now claims, “then the expression of humanity is complete in that person”.
Themes
Dual Nature of Humanity
Schiller emphasises the dual nature of humans as both rational and emotional beings. He argues that true beauty arises from a balance between these two aspects.
Schiller's concept on the dual nature of humanity is based on his reading of the French Revolution's reign of terror. He thought that it had been a great historical moment missed through lack of rationality, morality and spirituality. In short:
“A great moment has found a little people.”
His analysis distinguished the concepts of Stofftrieb (the sense drive) and Formtrieb (the form drive). Humanity, according to Schiller, must learn to understand and balance these forces, which tense our dual nature as physical beings and existential persons.
Man’s animal nature is driven by the sense drive. This is equivalent to man’s sensual self, our existence as a spatial-temporal being who lives among other sensual entities. This sensual drive, he warns us, always threatens to overrun the form drive.
The form drive is our rational capacity. Through this dynamic people make sense of the principles of human existence. Yet attending to the form drive necessitates that we live in the sensual world; the form drive, in other words, is no mere abstraction but must be integrated with the sensual world. When the sense drive continually overrides the form drive, Schiller warns, this is when we should become concerned that a great moment has evaded a little people.
Duty and Nature
Schiller believed in the importance of moral duty, which he often linked to the concept of freedom. He argued that true freedom comes from acting in accordance with moral laws rather than mere personal desires.
The author often viewed Nature as a source of beauty and inspiration. He believed that Nature reflects a divine order and that humans can learn from its harmony and balance. In some of his works, Schiller explores the tension between natural instincts and societal duties. He suggests that while Nature drives human passions, it is through the exercise of reason and moral duty that individuals can achieve true fulfilment.
Schiller's philosophy emphasises the need to reconcile the demands of duty with the impulses of nature. He believed that a harmonious existence required individuals to cultivate their moral sensibilities while remaining connected to the natural world. This synthesis is evident in his plays, such as "William Tell" and "The Robbers," where characters often grapple with their responsibilities in the face of natural instincts and societal expectations. He believes that his analysis of duty and nature reflects his belief in the potential for human beings to achieve moral and aesthetic harmony through the interplay of these two fundamental aspects of existence.
Aesthetics
Friedrich Schiller’s beautiful society is one where humanity has progressed from a state where people are primarily motivated by their natural needs to a state where their primary incentive is the moral will, that is, where citizens behave in a harmonious, unified manner out of a natural inclination. More specifically, in the beautiful society, people no longer experience the conflict between the sensuous will and the moral will. The absence of this conflict makes them stand apart from people in other societies because they possess what Schiller describes as a ‘beautiful soul’. And they are able to develop beautiful souls by being exposed to great works of art, since great art sets them free from their sensuous wills and enables them to embrace the rational and moral will.
Kant had described art very differently, arguing that a beautiful work of art objectively produces pleasure in a disinterested observer. This implies that for us to see that an object is beautiful is not just to give in to our personal inclination; rather, the pleasure we feel is something anyone can experience. However, if art is primarily a source of pleasure, it is indistinguishable from watching sports or eating a good meal. Why is art different from other pleasurable endeavours?
Schiller responds that continual exposure to art has a significant effect on the individual. It brings about a balance between our two fundamental drives: our desire for sensation and our desire to reason as manifest in the moral will. Anyone able to achieve this harmonious balance is a beautiful person. A beautiful person has developed the capacity both to act morally and to enjoy the pleasures the world has to offer. This internal equilibrium sets them free because they are not dominated either by strife or by puritanical moral rectitude. So Schiller had moved away from Kant’s experiential account of beauty to a functional one, although he had chosen a function we would not normally associate with art, morality. Unlike Kant, who in his Critique of Judgement (1790) concentrated on the beauty of natural objects, Schiller was more interested in the inner beauty of the human soul.
Schiller recommended this exposure to the arts in his philosophical work, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794), where it is part of a developed political theory. In every person there is a ratio of the sensuous will to the moral/rational will, and it is necessary to balance both. Yet governments seem either to tolerate or enhance this imbalance.
For Schiller, most societies do not have true political and economic freedom, and this absence of true freedom prevents people from developing the rational/moral will. Political regimes either directly or indirectly encourage their citizens to live in an overly sensuous manner that corrupts their moral growth. Exposure to aesthetic experience brings the balance about. Exposure to art brings about the good person because during our artistic experience we are shielded from the pernicious pressures of society. When we look at a painting or listen to music, for example, we go through a period of engagement with the world, and in this way can improve the equilibrium of our character.
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