Abstract
Written in 1859 amid industrialisation, revolutions, and rising class conflict, Mill and his wife Harriet framed their book as a philosophical defense of individual freedom within emerging capitalist democracies
The Mills argue that the only justified interference with personal liberty is to prevent harm to others, advocating absolute freedom of thought, expression, and voluntary action as essential for truth, progress, and societal utility. While upholding private property and existing class structures, Mill contends that society may limit actions only when they cause direct harm, rejecting most moral or paternalistic regulations and using utilitarian reasoning to justify his liberal stance.
Context
Revolutions
When Stuart & Harriet Mill published On Liberty in 1859, the world was well advanced into the beginnings of the second Industrial Revolution. Railroads, steamships, and transatlantic telegraphy were creating closer global connections. With them, new social relationships were emerging in which wage labour and class struggles were increasingly important and social conflict over these issues seemed more pronounced.
Much of Europe was overtaken by a wave of revolutions in 1848, and even Britain was the site of protests by the Chartist movement, in which workers sought to extend democratic rights beyond restrictive property limitations. Occasionally this sparked violence, as in the 1819 Peterloo Massacre, where British forces attacked and killed protestors who wanted an extension of voting rights.
Much of the globe, meanwhile, was in similar tumult. European empires were attempting to colonise much of the world and had already been successful in many cases. In others, like the new countries of Latin America, national republics and home rule had taken the place of empire. Mid-19th-century elites like Mill were deliberating the best way forward for nations of Western Europe and the world amid social turmoil and unrest driven by the working and governed classes.
John Stuart Mill wrote On Liberty (1859) with his wife, Harriet Taylor Mill, both of whom were engaged in leading liberal progressive causes of the day, including women's rights, abolition of slavery, labour rights, and others. The questions of social rights, liberty, and how far to push reforms were the leading social questions of the mid-19th century. The Mills remained committed to nationalist free-market democracies and European empire, but for them the justification for this social order was based on individual liberty, societies constructed to allow the utmost freedom of action possible for those capable of self-government. Their essay is their attempt at a philosophical justification of that order.
The Enlightenment and the Limits of Reform
The Enlightenment, a revolution in political philosophy, had given rise to the political revolutions of the 18th century, notably those in France, the United States, and Haiti. And by 1800 many of the feudal, aristocratic orders of the old world were being undone. In their place were new, modern nation-states, based on the idea of governance by citizen representation and the "natural rights of man".
But these "new" rights themselves were vaguely defined and the philosophical justification of these new rights was growing stale in the eyes of many conservative observers of the foundation of the new nation states. In 1698 the British philosopher John Locke had published his Two Treatises of Government, which justified governance based on property rights. French philosopher and radical Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Social contract theory (1762) had argued that the social order was formed of implicit social agreement between rulers and the ruled based on protection of social rights. While these works had breathed revolutionary fire into the movements of the 18th century, by the 19th century they were taken for granted. Further, the various problems of the 1850s, such as class struggle and social rights beyond propertied men, were not addressed in these works.
In On Liberty The Mills set themselves the task of updating the notions of the Enlightenment, particularly those of individual freedom, for the modern era. And they sought to provide a philosophical justification for governance and capitalism based on the new order of social rights.
Industrialisation
A major development not anticipated by the social philosophers of the Enlightenment was the dramatic change wrought by the first Industrial Revolution (1760–1840). Primarily seen at the time as a technological and economic transformation, the Industrial Revolution also remade social relationships, producing new social classes and disrupting old notions of patronage and obligation. With industrial production came two historic needs: the need for unprecedented quantities of capital to fund, construct, and operate the new factories and the need for hundreds, or sometimes thousands, of workers to make them run.
These needs were the bases for an emergent new class structure, not of aristocrats and commoners, but of capitalist owners and labouring workers. The divide created tremendous social inequality, in which the owners did little and grew wealthy while the working class slaved under miserable conditions, as recorded in German industrialist and socialist Friedrich Engels's 1844 work The Condition of the Working Class in England. In the new industrial cities of London, Manchester, and Liverpool, the working class were crowded into densely packed urban slums where poverty and disease were common. Routinely the working poor were kept from access to voting by property restrictions or antiquated representational measures, and cultural standards presumed the working class unfit for self-governance. Mill set out to consider what the Enlightenment values said about these people, about whether the poor and the working class were to be given the same rights as others, particularly men of property and other social elites.
In his focus on individual liberty irrespective of condition, one can see Mill tackling the major "social question" of the day. His answer is that all persons should be allowed the fullest extent of their natural liberty so long as it does not harm others. In this formulation a progressive notion of industrial capitalism can be seen, one in which each person has equal rights, but the basic relations of classes and ownership of property remain unchanged. The paradox of this relationship, who will therefore enforce equal rights under conditions of unequal power, remains unresolved in Mill's work and is a question democratic capitalistic societies wrestle with today.
Communism
In addition to the Enlightenment and industrialisation, Mill was responding to the new critiques of the entire liberal tradition. By 1859 a global movement of working-class people had radicalised and developed new ideologies. Socialism, the idea that workers should control property and production; Communism, the idea that workers should create a classless society; Anarchism, a version of these ideas that included the abolition of the state in addition to property and class.
These new ideologies offered far-reaching solutions to poverty and the social order and new explanations of the social forces that left the working poor with so little. The most significant work in this vein was the 1848 publication by the German philosophers and revolutionaries Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels of the Communist Manifesto, which argued that workers around the world should unite and overthrow the ruling capitalists, the bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels argued that these workers had "nothing to lose but [their] chains." Other thinkers, notably the French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in What is Property? (1840), found that the buying and selling of property under industrial capitalism amounted to theft from the common people.
For those who sought to defend and perhaps improve the social order, the social conflict from industrialisation and the ideas of socialism were significant challenges. After a half-century of nationalist democracies based on capital and private property, many, especially the poor, believed that their conditions were not improving and turned to socialism to provide answers. Mill too was concerned, worried that the system of democracy would undo established freedoms, such as the rights of property, but also other social rights like free speech. Mill's book is a response to the critics of the principles of capitalist democracy. On Liberty sought to demonstrate that societies based on individual rights, rather than collective interests, would ultimately produce the most good.
Commentary
Chapter 1: Introduction
Mill begins the chapter by explaining that this book will not be about the "liberty of the will", of what philosophers refer to as the free will problem, or questions of internal cognition or agency. Instead, Mill's essay is a work of political philosophy, of the relation of the individual to society, of what he calls "civil or social liberty". Mill then states that the "most conspicuous feature" of human history is the "struggle between liberty and authority" and tells readers that the history of Britain and of ancient Greece and Rome is a struggle between the rulers and the ruled to set limitations on the power of the ruler. These limitations he calls "liberty", and he argues they developed over time two structures for the protection of liberty: first, creating "certain immunities" from power, what are today known as "political rights", that give subjects a degree of formal protections. The second is constitutional protections that check and limit the actions of the executive through the separation of powers.
This struggle against the tyranny of "a governing One", however, was radically transformed in the era of popular sovereignty and democratic practice. With this development, many in the tradition of "European liberalism" believed that struggle against authority was no longer significant. If through democratic practice the will of the people was exercised through government, how then could there be any tension or conflict with illegitimate authority? Mill argues that in practice, over the half-century of representative republics, two sets of problems arose. The first is that government is populated by people, those "who exercise the power", but they are "not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised". Further, in popular democracies the "strongest party", usually the majority, often rules over the interests or inclinations of the minority. He calls this, in a famous phrase, the "tyranny of the majority". This type of tyranny is more insidious because it requires not only the protection against the power of authority but also against the "prevailing opinion and feeling", that is, of ideas and discourse. Where and how to define these limits and protections Mill calls the "principal question in human affairs".
These limits are occasionally worked out through custom, but this is a tricky matter. Custom, for example, rarely is consciously articulated and therefore often lacks reason. Further, custom often masks individual personal interest, or "class interests", and feelings of "superiority", and these go on to provoke hostility, what he calls the "impatient dislike of superiority". While hierarchical arrangements such as these can lead to resentment, they can also produce "servility", which is equally harmful if the goal of society is to produce the greatest fruition of the individual. These types of standards therefore cannot be the basis for principles of governance. Rarely are the standards of freedom and tolerance practised on "principle" and from a "moral high ground". Occasionally this is done in the sphere of religion, but rarely, and usually only after dogmatic conflict has led to attrition, as even religious insurgents often revert to constrictive dogmatism once in power. The result of all of this is that the application or restriction of state power is deployed willy-nilly, without guiding principles for its use or limitation, and often based solely on the opinions, feelings, or sentiments of those with power.
The purpose of Mill's book, therefore, is to provide principles, philosophic justifications, and standards for the uses and limitations of government power. His guiding principle is that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection." Mill argues that the scope of activity for liberty is only checked "to prevent harm to others."
There are exceptions to this principle. For children or others who cannot take care of themselves, restrictions on freedom are merited. This is true for whole "races", Mill argues, groups of people or nations in their "nonage", and not "in the maturity of their faculties. " Mill makes it clear that this is not an argument from "abstract right", from the principles of the Enlightenment, but from "utility": adhering to this principle of liberty will produce the best society for all. He is also clear that this is not an argument that limits any type of compulsory action of the state, for example, paying taxes or providing for collective defence.
Therefore, Mill argues, "the appropriate region of human liberty" has three components. The first is the complete liberty of thought and belief, the "inward domain of consciousness", in all aspects. This might be applied to speech and often is "practically inseparable from it", but not always, because speech has the ability to impact society at large. The second is what he calls the "liberty of tastes and pursuits": the ability to live one's life to its fullest and in complete personal satisfaction and to bear the personal consequences, though others may disapprove. And finally, Mill argues that this type of individual liberty should also extend to voluntary collective action and association, again so long as such action does not harm others. The will to forcibly extend one's beliefs onto others is ever present in ancient as well as modern times and is often only absent for "want of power" to make it so. Therefore, defences of liberty, particularly liberty of thought, must be made now as ever.
Chapter 2: On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion
Chapter 2 begins by explaining that freedom of the press is a well-established principle of democracy. What concerns the authors, however, is a democratic government, acting in accordance with the will of the people, that limits the free speech of a minority. He very clearly calls this power "illegitimate", and he denies "the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government". The grounds for his denial are completely utilitarian, arguing not for the sanctity of any individual rights or rights to solely private opinions but because silencing an opinion robs "posterity as well as the existing generation" of the benefit of open exchange. This, Mill contends, is true regardless of whether the content of the speech is "right" or "wrong". If right, society obviously loses the benefit of the truth; if wrong, people lose the benefit of improving and clarifying their position of the truth through open debate.
The remainder of the chapter is left to defend these two positions. On the first defence of free thought and expression, that an offending position is true, Mill finds that there is no authority that can justify its censure. Such a power would have to be "infallible" or act with "absolute certainty", neither of which is possible. To the objection that Mill's argument of infallibility could be applied to any action, that there is always a level of uncertainty and that that uncertainty should not block normal activity, Mill responds that this is so, but that silencing speech precludes the possibility of action, that it is by silencing speech that sets an absolute closure on action. He writes,
"Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion ... is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purpose of action."
In short, Mill says that by silencing speech, action is foreclosed. The act of censorship is not an action but the negating of an action.
Mill then entertains a series of questions posed as counterarguments. First he tackles the question of what brings about human progress and the refinement of human ideas from a long history of "erroneous" conclusions from the past. What is the source of human wisdom? Mill finds that wisdom is not developed in a vacuum but is part of a process of studying and considering as wide a scope as possible of thought and opinion on a given topic. Next he asks whether some ideas are not necessary to the very functioning of governance. If so, they should not be questioned or they should not be allowed to be challenged. But Mill finds this is an argument based on the usefulness of an idea or opinion and that "the usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion" and not free from the logic of considered engagement that he advocates above. Therefore, no idea fundamentally "useful" to the practice of governance is outside the realm of open debate.
The chapter then engages questions of ideas that truly are certainties, for example, principles of human morality or belief in God. Again, Mill finds that while these principles may be universally true, to limit the freedom of engagement on the question is to deny others the ability to decide for themselves. Furthermore, it is certainty that is at the root of some of the worst mistakes of history. By way of example, Mill recounts the trial and execution of Socrates for impiety and corruption of the youth, essentially, for ideas. Yet 1,800 years of history have condemned the Athenian state for the certainty with which they killed Socrates as one of the great and tragic injustices of history.
Another example he gives is of Marcus Aurelius (121 CE-180), an ideal Christian in all but name, who persecuted Christians, believing their religion to be false, before Christianity was made the official state religion under Constantine. Shifting gears, Mill argues that those who say truth ultimately wins out over falsehood are mistaken. History shows that persecution often effectively squelches truth. Society no longer executes heretics, but social ostracism and marginality can be an equally effective measure for silencing dissent. In the social environment in which heretical ideas are silenced, it is not the heretics who primarily suffer. Instead, the great loss is to society. Individual great thinkers may be produced in environments of conformity, but more important is an atmosphere that can create an "intellectually active" population in general. In those conditions great ideas are produced through the process of exchange and debate.
The authors then turns to the second of his conjectures: that even if it's false, a contrary idea should receive full freedom because it contributes to the process of refining and improving truths more widely accepted. In this way ideas are prevented from becoming a "dead dogma" so they can thrive as a vibrant "living truth". Indeed, truths not rigorously debated and engaged become like another "superstition", accepted without question, rather than continually tested for their veracity.
To the question that people can be taught to have correct opinions like they are taught geometry or mathematics, Mill argues this is a faulty comparison. Mathematics has but one definitive answer. Problems of human society and discourse are not so simple: there are often conflicting positions, all with elements of truth, which can be rectified only through open exchange. Indeed, a person familiar with only one side of an argument is not truly acquainted with its full reasoning. For that, other positions must be explored and refuted. Some may argue that open debate is indispensable for philosophers and theologians but unnecessary for common people. Mill counters that to limit freedom of expression for some is to limit freedom of expression for all, and that without full and open debate at all levels of society, even the learned suffer for want of stimulus.
Ideas lose their vitality through lack of debate, and Mill explores this central idea of the chapter through several examples. Most religious doctrines have grown and flourished in an atmosphere of intellectual debate. In this time of constant contestation, a true position will gain adherents, and as it grows in acceptance, it becomes challenged less and less. As a result, the position is accepted without thought or reason and loses its vitality, becoming a "hereditary creed" without much thought. This can be seen in Christians who profess a belief in the tenets of Christianity but behave very differently. For them "the sayings of Christ coexist passively in their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland." Taking on another question, Mill asks whether doubt and debate are necessary for truth and whether, once established, truth is uncontestable. Indeed, debate is necessary, he finds. For example, the Socratic dialogues remain so fresh for us today because they are argued through a "negative" position in the form of a dialogue.
Mill now introduces a third justification for the defence of free thought and speech. He argues that orthodox and heretical opinions both contain elements of truth, to greater or lesser degrees, even though people have a tendency to view issues "with exclusiveness", that is, one-sided issues in black and white. Instead, Mill argues, "the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part." Hence in politics and other human affairs, parties of "order" and of "progress" are both necessary. Some may object, for instance, that Christian doctrine provides the complete and definitive truth on questions of morality. Mill argues that even this doctrine presupposes a moral order independent of itself. Furthermore, the process of defining truth came through edits, changes, and refinements, open debate and exchange. For example, Christian teaching lacks notions of public-minded governance found in the Koran or the "high-minded" humanism of the ancient Greeks or Romans. Mills argues that the books of the Bible "contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth."
Mill concludes the chapter with a summary of his main points and a discussion of "intemperance" of speech. For those who argue that invective or ad hominem have no place in reasoned discourse, Mill says that while this may be so, accusations of intemperance are often politically motivated, so insurgent ideas often face the brunt of accusations of intemperance or lack of fair discussion, usually as a way to silence debate. Therefore, even the manner in which debate progresses should not be silenced or limited.
Chapter 3: Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being
This chapter begins by taking the precepts of the previous chapter and applying them to broader notions of freedom of individual activity.
First, there are important limitations to speech when they become actions. For example, a document saying that "private property is robbery" delivered in a paper is different than if it were delivered orally to a mob. With that said, for the individual, "the same reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he should be allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost," provided that "he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgement in things which concern himself."
While differing opinions are "useful", so too are different "modes of living", and here too the widest possible freedom should be allowed. Too many people are satisfied with conformity and tradition. Instead, "individual spontaneity" should be more highly valued. Mill quotes German philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt, who says that "the end of man ... is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole." Hence, and again quoting Humboldt, Mill finds that "individual vigour and manifold diversity" should be the highest callings of social organisation.
To Mill, people should not unquestioningly accept the traditions and mores of the past but should question those traditions and seek to find individual fulfilment and satisfaction. There is no one formula, guideline, or set of standards for living that applies to all persons. Individuals have different needs and preferences that should be allowed to flourish based on their own interests and practices. People have desires and impulses and consciousnesses that all play a part in creating a whole person. These factors can be said to be human "energy", which may be directed in positive or negative avenues. Sometimes, particularly in the past, this places individuality at odds with society, for which rules and restrictions are required. Too often people bow to these rules, as with Calvinist theory, which emphasises obedience, leading to people being made "cramped and dwarfed".
Instead, argues Mill, human diversity and individuality incomparably benefit the social whole, improving thought and general condition. This is a reciprocal process whereby "each person becomes more valuable to himself and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others." So each person should be allowed the widest personal freedom, which is the foundation for both individual development and social development. Now, there may be some who reject personal liberty for themselves and for others, but they would benefit by allowing others fuller expression of themselves so individual talents and insights can be developed uniquely and applied for the benefit of all. While not everyone's action will benefit the whole, there are some unique individuals, the "salt of the earth", from whose talents and insights all will gain advantage. Furthermore, individual genius can only develop in this environment of tolerance and expression. In sum, "all good things which exist are the fruits of originality," which itself cannot develop in an environment of conformity.
While most of history owes its development to this individual originality, Mill argues, his contemporary period was marked by "collective mediocrity". Instead of great individual feats, the modern era is marked by mass phenomena, for example, public opinion or class interests, whereby masses follow leaders without much thought or originality. This condition reflects the "present low state of the human mind", in which many "bend the knee" to conformity and custom. Instead, what is needed is "eccentricity", the ability of the individual to buck dominant social trends. Individuality is not reserved for unique or talented individuals but for all people: humans are as unique in mental proclivities as they are in physical attributes.
According to Mill, the progress of improvement and liberty may be at odds at times, but what he calls the "despotism of custom" is always at odds with both. An example for him is China, where, according to Mill, a once thriving and advanced civilisation became enamoured with custom and retarded their development, whereby the European peoples have overtaken them. Much of Europe, however, Mill argues, is on the path of conformity that led to stagnation in China. Indeed, Europe is rapidly becoming prey to assimilation, with the same or similar habits of activity, reading, and thought. "The desire for rising", once the domain of "a particular class", had in Mill's time become the want "of all classes". Particularly concerning is the rise of public opinion in the affairs of state, which increases conformity. Mill concludes by arguing that the defence of liberty should be made now against further encroachment.
Chapter 4: Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual
Here the Mills start with several questions about the relationship of an individual to society. Specifically, given the picture of expansive freedom presented in the previous chapters, what then is the proper limit of individual sovereignty? What constitutes legitimate action by society? What are the proper spheres of individual and society's action?
Given that individuals benefit from the protections of society, they are obligated to "observe a certain line of conduct", including not harming others and bearing a proportionate share of social obligations and responsibilities. If individuals fail to live up to these terms, society is justified in enacting punishment and persecution to rectify the harm. According to Mill, this is not to say that no individual should consider the interests of anyone else; on the contrary, "human beings owe to each other help" to exercise "higher faculties" and mutual benefit. This, of course, excludes any action primarily impacting the individual. And further, by "action of society", Mill does not mean personal feelings of admiration or disapprobation or other forms of group social pressure regarding individual action. These feelings and relations can hardly be avoided, and people are firmly within their right to disassociate with those they find distasteful. Numerous "odious" personal qualities may be chastised in this way, but they do not fall into the category of actionable social effect which is the basis of this chapter. However, if the "evil consequences" of an action fall primarily on others, then society is justified in taking punishment, in Mill's phrase, "must retaliate", as part of the responsibility of society to protect its members.
The authors pose a counterargument in the form of a question: given that people are social animals, how can one differentiate between actions that primarily impact the individual versus those that primarily impact society? Furthermore, does society not also have an obligation to protect those it is punishing, and if they are unfit for self-governance, to act to protect them from vice or other actions harmful to themselves? The Mills insist that only when others are hurt may society act to punish. For example, if immoral behaviour leads a man to default on his debts, he may be punished for harming others by not paying what is owed but not for the immorality of actions that led to his condition. If those actions had impacted only himself, then society would have no recourse. In this case it is a cost that "society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom." One cannot compel individuals to moral or virtuous behaviour. Inevitably, it will produce the opposite outcome: resentment and hostility to the ideas imposed.
The Mills argue that ultimately the strongest case against social action on individual moral affairs is that such action is often "wrong". While society can properly judge harm to itself and its members, it cannot judge harm to an individual, because this raises the problem of a majority compelling action on a minority. Mill uses a religious example to illustrate: Christians and Muslims disagree about whether one can eat pork. He argues that Muslims may be able to properly ban pork against a religious minority of Christians because it is no one's duty to eat pork, although this would be a violation of individual freedoms. There are other examples from Puritans, Catholics, and Mormons, like mandatory observation of religious holidays and so on. One other important example is American efforts to impose temperance laws. Mill finds faulty the argument that the prohibition of alcohol is just because excessive drinking creates public disorder and nuisance and therefore impinges on the "social rights" of others. Mill argues that we do not have the social right to compel everyone to act as they ought or as we would prefer. If this means that civilisation succumbs to barbarism, then so be it. If society has become so "degenerate" as to fall to barbarity, then "the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit, the better."
Chapter 5: Applications
Mill opens the chapter by restating his primary claims: that when an individual's actions impact first themselves, they are "not accountable to society" for those actions. However, if those actions negatively impact others, then they "may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments. " Mill clarifies these obligations by saying that competition and contests for individual success do not necessarily constitute harm, and society should not take action. Trade, on the other hand, does impact society, and therefore is something on which the public can take action. Mill argues that free trade has proven to be the most effective, but that this is a completely separate question from the topic of the book on individual liberty. Therefore, worker protections and prevention of fraud are acceptable, but banning certain commodities is not. For example, the banning of poison because it may be used to harm others is not sufficient. Poison has other legitimate uses. Societies could take up consumer registries or other safeguards should poison be used for nefarious purposes, but that would be the limit of proper social action.
Mill goes on to state that society has the right to protect itself, but most social crimes, like drunkenness, do not rise to the threshold of actionable cause. There are a series of actions that are more complicated, for example, when two or more people are engaged in harmful behaviour, or when they induce others to join them, or when they profit from such activities. Mill states that fornication cannot be considered a social harm, but that acting as a pimp or running a gambling house are more difficult. There are cases "which lie on the exact boundary line between" his principles of individual freedom and social action. There are many variations to this question: for example, could society rightly act to make access to harmful vices more difficult or expensive? Mill finds that if the purpose is to prohibit the substance, the answer is no, but if taxes are imposed for revenue, a legitimate function of society, then these may be permitted. A general exception is for people who have proven the need to be "governed as children".
Mill goes on to discuss other difficult cases of personal freedom. If individuals decide to take collective action of mutual concern, so long as they don't harm others, their actions should be permitted. People who chose to sell themselves into slavery provide a special problem. Mill finds that society can properly limit this action because society's chief concern should be the protection of individual liberty, and slavery obviously violates personal liberty. All labour contracts should therefore be temporary; even marriage should likely be temporary, except when a "third party", like children, is negatively impacted. This is only if the two parties are equal. In the case of marriage, the "almost despotic power of husbands" should be undone, and men and women should have equal legal rights. The state also has an obligation to educate children where the parents fail to do so. The Mills then explore how state education could work with an emphasis on personal liberty. Children have the right to a reasonable existence, and where parents cannot provide this or overpopulation contributes to social problems, society may properly set limits on procreation.
In the final section of the chapter, Mill explores the correct limits to government action and finds three types, which he says are tangential to the main arguments of this book. The first is when private action is to be superior to government action and hence should limit much government legislation of industry. A second order of objections is when individual work may be worse than government action but is necessary or important for the individual's development. Government action should be limited, although this has little to do with questions of liberty, Mill states. The third reason is to keep government accretion of power at bay by limiting government action to specific spheres of activity. Civil service exams to create a professional bureaucracy should be avoided for this reason. Where Russia and France have an excess of bureaucracy, the Americans are competent and sufficient without one. And this is as it should be, for rulers, as much as the ruled, are slaves to the institutional order. How to apply these standards is extremely difficult and should be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. However, Mill offers one guiding principle to help:
"the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency, but the greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from the centre."
Mill then advocates a federated system of governance with a centralised information service as the best model of government.
Themes
Utilitarianism
A major undercurrent of the text is Mill's philosophy of utilitarianism. Other than On Liberty, Mill's best-known work is Utilitarianism, a system of philosophy that seeks to establish social, moral, and political rights based on "usefulness" or utility, often equated with general happiness. In On Liberty, Mill seeks to use the philosophy of utilitarianism to justify his social principles. This emphasis is partially a response to conservative critics who disagreed with the theory that free speech was a "right". This theory had its roots in the Enlightenment and was one of the pillars on which the revolutions of France and the United States rested: the principle that free speech was an "inherent" human right, inseparable from the integrity and dignity of each individual. Conservative critics of the notion argued that there was no justification for the concept of "rights", that, in fact, the theory was made up for political purposes, for example, in struggles against monarchal rule.
In response to these arguments, Mill tries to establish liberty on the basis of something more defensible than the airy notion of "rights". For this he turns to utility. Mill's basic argument is that individual freedoms, for example, the freedom of thought or discourse, are not based on individuals' inherent right to think what they please, but that when individuals are allowed to think, speak, and act how they wish, without harming others, the best results are produced not only for that person but for society in general.
Simply put, Mill believes that societies are propelled forward into prosperity, inventiveness, and creativity when individuals are allowed to develop the full scope of their talents and interests without fear of persecution or dogmatism. That atmosphere is only possible when people have free exchange and open discourse. An environment of free speech is the foundation on which other benefits like individual genius and social prosperity flourish. The philosophical justification here is the result — the happy and prosperous society — not a claim to moral, social, or political rights as fundamental to human existence. Hence "liberty" and the relations of free people in society are highly useful for general success. This is the essence of utilitarianism: that the ends justify the means.
There are many possible grounds on which to object to this notion. For example, utility tends to turn people into instruments, using them for someone else's purposes. This tendency obviously could lead to many ethical and moral problems. It is possible that Mill's emphasis on the individual, in particular individual achievement and liberty, is meant to check this concern. But utilitarianism and liberty are in tension throughout the work, the two arguments developing together in the text.
Truth
Another major theme Mill uses as justification throughout his work is to appeal to "truth" as justification for free speech. Mill's discussion and use of truth is complex, but he uses the pursuit of truth as a major buttress for his argument. Mill's basic argument about speech is developed in three steps in Chapter 2, each one involving an appeal to truth. Whether dissenting speech is false, true, or partially true and partially false, Mill argues, in all cases it should be allowed to progress free from interference because it allows for the refinement and development of greater social "truth" to improve society and benefit all. However, Mill never defines what he means by "truth", what its source could be, or how he envisions it benefitting society.
In this line of argument, Mill was likely influenced by British positivism, the notion that empirical science and insights through human cognition can generate known truths about the world and human existence. The entire framework of his chapter on speech, for example, has this character: that through the process of debate and argument, truth can be discovered and refined. Indeed, throughout the work, Mill seems to argue as if there were a fixed truth to which humans are slowly progressing in their quest for greater knowledge. This is one perspective about the world and our knowledge of it that has since been questioned by other philosophical movements such as deconstructivism and postmodernism.
At some points, Mill appears to have a complex notion of truth that foreshadows ideas that will emerge later in the 20th century. At times, he seems to find that truths contain partial falsehoods and that even when established, they need to be continually challenged to retain their vigour and meaning. But that Mill even entertains the notion that truths can be definitively established speaks to his positivist notion of fundamental truth.
Liberty
From the outset, Mill makes it clear his goal is to properly highlight the relationship of the individual to society. Mill establishes individual human freedom and scope of activity in tension with human social organisation, rather than fundamentally in harmony with it. This tension is what drives the entire work, as Mill sets out to discover the proper limits of both individual and social action. His principle that individuals should be allowed the broadest possible scope of freedom while society should be limited as much as possible highlights these tensions. This discussion contains a number of points:
First is Mill's use of the word "society" rather than "state" or "government" to define and delimit social action. This choice is curious, since Mill addresses himself to social democracies, where popular will ostensibly is at the helm of the state and therefore would presumably serve Mill's purpose. It is likely he uses the word "society" not to limit himself to just government action but to speak broadly about a whole scope of social institutions, including the Church or other forms of social authority that could limit individual freedom in the interest of conformity. In this sense Mill unquestionably sees individuals in tension with all of society rather than just state or government authority, and his argument is much more about a full range of human expression rather than simply political freedom.
Part of the tension that Mill posits between the individual and society stems from his distrust of even the best form of government rule — democracy, in his opinion — to properly protect the principle of liberty. Here Mill was writing in a political context in which liberal democracies had emerged as the preeminent form of government organisation, firmly established through, and despite, a series of revolutions in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. With democratic governance coming into its own, Mill saw possible dangers, specifically what he called the "tyranny of the majority"—the tendency of even a democratic government to inflict limitations on individual liberty. It is also important to note that Mill saw these notions of individual liberty as applying to property, and that here his ideas should also be seen as a response to the socialist challenges of the mid-19th century. The Mills' defence of individual liberty served as a bulwark not just for personal expression but against political philosophies and social movements gaining credence in mid-century.
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