Context
The question of self-awareness has a long human tradition. Neolithic burial practices seem to express spiritual beliefs and offer evidence for reflective thought about the nature of human consciousness.
However, it has been argued that the modern concept of consciousness arose after the Homeric era. This view sustains that earlier humans did not experience themselves as subjects in the way we do today. Classical Greece had no word equivalent to consciousness.
The Reformation's emphasis on conscience, though different from consciousness, may have emphasised the inner modern reflection of self. Hamlet's reflections in the 1600s already offered a modern vision of the world and self.
With the advent of the Modern Era in the 17th century Descartes defined the term thought (pensée) as self-awareness. In Principles of Philosophy (1640) he wrote,
"By the word ‘thought’ (pensée) I understand all that of which we are conscious as operating in us."
John Locke offered another notion of consciousness in his An Essay on Human Understanding (1688):
"I do not say there is no soul in man because he is not sensible of it in his sleep. But I do say he can not think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but our thoughts, and to them it is and to them it always will be necessary."
Locke regarded consciousness as essential to thought and identity, but made no hypothesis about its relationship to matter.
Leibniz offered a theory of mind in Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). He distinguished between perception (awareness) and apperception (self-awareness). In Monadology (1720) he told his industrial analogy of a mill to reject the idea that consciousness could arise from matter. This invites the reader to imagine walking through a mill and observing its mechanical operations, which for Leibniz represented its physical nature. He then challenges the reader to see any conscious thoughts.
Associationist psychology was followed by Hume in the 18th century and Mill in the 19th century. Its aim was to discover the principles by which conscious thoughts or ideas affected each other. In the late 18th century Kant was a critic of associated psychology and argued against this account of consciousness through a succession of associated ideas. He considered that it must be the experience of a conscious self placed in an objective world organised through space, time and causality.
In the early 20th century the rise of behaviourism in the US eclipsed the study of consciousness. However, in Europe an interest in the structure of experience led to a study of phenomenology by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others, who extended research into consciousness to include the spheres of the social, the body and the interpersonal.
Towards the end of the 20th century there was a resurgence in scientific and philosophical research into the nature of consciousness.
At the outset of this renewed investigation into consciousness researchers tried to identify empirical correlations between conscious experiences and brain activity. However, despite identifying many connections, these neural correlates of consciousness did not explain the phenomenon.
Presently there are neurobiological theories of consciousness, which is progress because it is only when clarified in a theory that experimentation can offer an understanding of consciousness. Anil Seth, professor of Cognitive and Computational Neuroscience at the University of Sussex, a proponent of materialist explanations of consciousness, asserts in a New Scientist article that there are four main theories of consciousness:
- The higher-order theories affirm that a mental state is considered conscious when another, hierarchical state, sanctions that it is. The problem is knowing what types of higher-order representations count as consciousness.
- Theories of global workspace assert that a conscious state is present when it is spread widely through the brain and so can be employed to guide behaviour flexibly. A conscious mental state will have access to many cognitive processes; unconscious states do not.
- Integrated information theory deals with the experiential aspects of consciousness. It theorises that consciousness is linked to a cortical area at the back of the brain, including other parts of the same. Consciousness depends on the ability of the whole system to generate unified information.
- Predictive processing attempts to build interpretive bridges between consciousness and neural mechanisms. The approach of these theories is to account for different aspects of consciousness in order to move from scientific theories about consciousness to theories of consciousness itself.
Summary
In The Extended Mind (1998) Andy Clark and David Chalmers propounded the thesis that the mind does not only reside in the brain or even the body, but extends into the physical world.
I. Introduction
The authors explain their approach in what they term "active externalism", referring to the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes.
II. Extended Cognition
They consider three cases:
1. A person is at a computer and has to mentally rotate the geometrical shapes displayed to fit sockets. (As in Tetris).
2. The person at the computer now has a button which rotates the shapes, or she can just use her imagination. The button makes the job faster.
3. A person with a neural implant can rotate the images like a computer. She must decide whether to use her mind or the implant, as each option makes different demands on attention and other brain processes.
Clark and Chalmers ask how much cognition is needed in each case. Cases 1 & 3 are equal. Case 2 distributes processing between the subjet and the computer. They ask what the cognitive difference is between 2 & 3. Their aim is to support the hypothesis that the computational structures are the same in the agent herself and with external tools.
As in the computer examples the subject's brain processes some operations and external media perform others. Another example is the use of pen and paper to do a multiplication or the external help of language, books, diagrams and culture.
III. Active Externalism
The authors explain that in cases of active externalism the human organism interacts bidirectionally with some external entity to form a single cognitive system. All elements in the system are causal and they all influence behaviour. The writers' thesis is that this coupled system is a wholly cognitive process, even if it is not all in the head.
Clark and Chalmers then differentiate their active externalism from the passive externalism of Putnam and Burge. They underline that external features play an important role in the cognitive process and influence the organism and its behaviour. The internal and external elements are not in a chain, but a loop.
The authors defend their thesis as more than terminology, emphasising that it has made a difference to the methodology of scientific investigation. They adduce that by including explanations of both inward and outward processes understanding of cognition will be richer.
Those who disagree with the extended mind hypothesis may think that all cognitive processes are conscious. However, this is not so as crucial roles are played by unconscious processing, such as memory retrieval, language and acquiring skills. This means that even if external processes are not internal conscious operations, that is not an argument for denying their cognitivity.
Others may object that if the cognitive process needs external tools that may not be carried with the person, they are not to be classed as cognitive. But the authors reply saying that in the future we may have tools plugged into our brains. As counting on your fingers is a cognitive process the question is more about the reliability than the availability of the internal/external coupling.
They note that humans cognitive and perceptual systems make use of the environment. They exploit the structure of natural scenes and use computational shortcuts available through bodily movement and locomotion. Language also allows cognition processes through actively coupling external/internal systems, as in group brainstorming. They point out that the child's brain may develop depending on how it adapts to external sources:
"and learns to play its role within a unified, densely coupled system."
The writers offer the analogy of a fish swimming efficiently in different currents. It couples its behaviours to the vortices of its environment. The fish swims by using vortices such as the water hitting a rock or self-propulsion by tail flaps. Both external and internal vortices are used by the fish to manoeuvre efficiently in its environment.
The authors use the fish analogy metaphorically where human language is the sea and we are fish. Just as the fish flaps its tail to provoke vortices which it then exploits, humans create linguistic structures whose predictable presence drives our inner cognition. Speech and its external symbols are among our cognitive vortices helping to build human thought.
IV. From Cognition to Mind
Some scientists may agree that cognitive processes involve outside elements, but that the mind cannot be externalised.
The authors distinguish between external factors which can contribute significantly and types of mental state. They argue that belief states can be constituted by environmental characteristics that play a role in driving cognitive processes. They consider:
“a normal case of belief embedded in memory.”
Case 1. Inga’s memory recall
Inga wants to visit the New York MOMA which she believes is on 53rd. street. She can check her belief of the Museum's address which was available in her memory: belief came before checking.
Case 2. Otto’s external memory bank
Otto has Alzheimer's and he relies on environmental support to structure his life. This takes the form of a notebook where he writes down new information which he can consult. His notebook plays the role of biological memory. If he wants to visit the MOMA he checks its address in his book then walks to the museum. He believed he could find the Museum's address before checking his notes, just as Inga believed she knew the address before checking in her memory. Both believed in the sources of their information: memory and notebook. The only difference is that the book is outside Otto's body.
It might be objected that Otto only believes what is written in his notebook. However, that is the same as saying Inga only believes what she is explicitly conscious of. In both cases the information is there, reliably available to consciousness.
Case 3. Otto’s Twin with incorrect information
The twin also has Alzheimer and has a notebook where he has written the wrong MOMA address. The salient belief feature of the twin is that he believes this incorrect address. The conclusion is that there is nothing sacred about either skill or skull. Belief in information depends on the role it plays and this can be internal or external to the body.
Objections
1: Inga has more reliable access to the information. Someone can take away Otto's notebook, but Inga's is safely in her head. However, in the example Otto has reliable access to the information, but Inga's memory may be unreliable as she can forget or:
"A surgeon might tamper with her brain, or more mundanely, she might have too much to drink. The mere possibility of such tampering is not enough to deny her the belief.”
Belief remains intact in both cases.
2: When Otto loses access to his notebook, this means his belief comes and goes. However, Inga also disconnects temporarily when she sleeps, or is intoxicated. This does not mean she has lost her belief. In both cases the salient point is that the information is readily available when needed.
3: Inga is able to access the information better since conscious thinking and memory are more connected than between Otto and his notes. However, Inga's friend Lucy has deficient memory-consciouness links, yet she can still access the relevant information and so Lucy also believes the Museum's address.
4: Inga accesses the information directly, but Otto only accesses it through perception. The authors reply by saying that Otto's perception lies within the cognitive system because it still relies on a belief.
V. Beyond the Outer Limits
The writers still question the limitations of their thesis. Does the information in a Filofax (file of facts) wallet count as part of memory? Is a person's cognitive state spread around the Internet?
The basic features characterising the thesis are:
1) The notebook is a constant in Otto’s life.
2) The notebook information is directly available.
3) Otto believes the information retrieved from his notebook.
4) The notebook information was approved in the past and is there because of that endorsement.
When we wander from these points the applicability of the idea of belief gradually wanes. If Otto does not consult his notebook consistently, then the information counts less as part of his belief system.
Cognition may also be socially extended. A waiter in your favourite restaurant may be the holder of your beliefs about your favourite meals. An accountant could also be construed as the embodiment of an employer's beliefs. In these social cases of coupling, language joins the two parts:
“Language, thus construed, is not a mirror of our inner states but a complement to them. It serves as a tool whose role is to extend cognition in ways that on-board devices cannot.”
An extended mind also implies an extended self. Otto's notebook is part of his identity and cognition. In fact Otto is an extended system, linking a biological organism with external tools. The alternative interpretation is to consider the self as a group of states with questionable continuity.
The authors conclude that if their extended mind thesis is correct it will have philosophical, social and moral consequences:
"As with any reconception of ourselves, this view will have significant consequences. There are obvious consequences for philosophical views of the mind and for the methodology of research in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the moral and social domains. It may be, for example, that in some cases interfering with someone's environment will have the same moral significance as interfering with their person. And if the view is taken seriously, certain forms of social activity might be reconceived as less akin to communication and action, and as more akin to thought. In any case, once the hegemony of skin and skull is usurped, we may be able to see ourselves more truly as creatures of the world."
Themes
Resonances
The extended mind hypothesis has cultural influences beyond academia. It challenges the definition of thinking, the role of technology in thought processes and how our environment interacts with our minds. Modern societies are reliant on computers and internet connectivity. If the extended mind thesis is accepted, this poses questions about human identity.
Art exhibitions are being inspired by the extended mind theory as stated by Clark when he suggests that the artists' sketchpad is more than just a tool: it is actually part of an extended cognitive system and it is a way of manipulating data that:
“... the biological brain would find hard, time-consuming, or even impossible.”
Clark's thesis has been applied by Professor Scaltsas to the notion that external objects are not only extensions of our minds, but also embody our values and ideas. Both philosophers are collaborating with the Greek Ministry of Culture to create a new type of museum where objects would be displayed that exemplify Greek ideas.
Education
Educationalists are encouraging learners to use their hands to extend their mind. Gesturing is an integral part of the cognitive loop involving communication feedback: with more gestures, more fluency in thinking and speaking. Notice the hand signals of someone giving directions to give shape to their thoughts.
It would add to efficient thinking if we offloaded our cognitive processes. The brain can only handle so much information and should be unburdened through offloading tools such as graphs and diagrams so that it can be used for reflection and analysis. This organisation of ideas is an act of human cognition.
The extended mind view of thinking has influenced education by becoming a modelling process where information is chunked and mastered one piece at a time in order to build learner confidence. Learning can be viewed as an apprenticeship where an expert demonstrates the process to the novice. In this way the teacher would tell the learner her thinking processes, rather than only the correct result or the appropriate data.
Criticisms of extended mind
Three basic criticisms of the theory have appeared and Clark replies to them in his book: Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (2008).
- Adams and Aizawa argue that the thesis confuses the concept of cognition with causal influences on cognition. They ask:
"Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4?"
Clark replied:
"Because it was coupled to the mathematician."
He explains that coupling is important for cognition, but it must play a functional role. If not, the external part is not an extension.
- Other critics object that extending our minds stretches the limits of cognition too far, implying that everything on the Internet forms part of individual cognitive systems.
Clark answers that neither the internal nor the external parts of the cognitive system are likely to produce cognition on their own. Examples such as calculators and pencils must be included with parallel neurological regions. Considering only this part does not wholly cover cognition.
- Yet others protest that the theory ignores differences between internal and external processes. These might be distinctions between beliefs and outside tools, or the creation of a concept of cognition that is too disparate to be typified scientifically.
Clark replies that he can imagine situations in which a biological being might process information non-neurally: humans with neural implants to support memory. Being neural, he argues, cannot be a necessary condition for being cognitive.
In Clark and Chalmers' original paper the extended mind thesis depended on considerations of parity between internal and external cognition. A reformulation of the thesis points to an emphasis on the complementarity of the internal and external elements of the cognitive process. This explanation underlines the analytical value of the theory for cognitive science rather than a claim about the nature of the mind or cognition.
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