Everything Must Go by Ladyman & Ross

Context

Everything Must Go by Ladyman & Ross et al. is a direct attack on analytic philosophy, which in turn was a rejection of idealism.

The idealists regarded any attempt to say something true about the world as a thesis about the nature of reality. However, since the aim of philosophy was the whole of nature, the thesis would have to be all-encompassing. This target was to be accomplished through a long philosophical dialogue in which individual philosophers would follow a hegelian model: a thesis contested by an antithesis, culminating in a synthesis.

The birth of analytical philosophy followed the decline of various forms of Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian idealism, which had dominated German and British philosophy at the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth Century, by authors such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The fundamental assumptions of analytical philosophy are double:

- The underlying nature of the world is revealed by an understanding of the nature of thought.

- The underlying nature of thought is revealed by an analysis of its linguistic expression.

Ladyman and Ross argue that contemporary analytic metaphysics is founded on the presupposition that objects are constructed out of relations. Their central theme is that particular objects — ‘things’ — are metaphysically second-grade since they lack ‘primitive identity’; they do not exist independently of each other; they are neither ‘self-subsistent’ nor ‘ontologically fundamental’. They affirm that what is metaphysically first-grade is relations or relational structure, which is more fundamental than objects. They call this view Ontic Structural Realism.

Summary 

Everything Must Go by James Ladyman et al. (2007) explores the implications of the metaphysical framework known as ontic structural realism. They argue against traditional notions of objects and substances, proposing instead that the fundamental nature of reality is relational and that entities are defined by their interactions and structures rather than by intrinsic properties.

Preface

The authors admit that this book is polemic. They contend that contemporary analytic metaphysics fails to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth and should be discontinued. 

However, they emphasise that their intentions are not hostile but originate in their distress that philosophy may be harmed by engaging with projects and methodologies which will bring it into disrepute, especially among scientists. 

Chapter 1 In Defence of Scientism

These authors defend a radically naturalistic metaphysics, which is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypotheses and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary science. They adopt the view that no alternative kind of metaphysics can be regarded as a legitimate part of our collective attempt to model the structure of objective reality. They recall the attitude of Wilfrid Sellars, who expressed a naturalistic conception of metaphysics when he said that the philosopher's aim should be:

“knowing one's way around with respect to the subject matters of all the special [scientific] disciplines” and “building bridges” between them. 

They insist that metaphysical explanations must contain evidence that they are true, at least in their general claims. If this criterion is not fulfilled, there is no reason for believing that they explain anything.

Chapter 2. Scientific Realism, Constructive Empiricism, and Structuralism

This chapter argues that a form of structural realism is motivated by reflection on issues around two different domains that have been the subject of intense scrutiny during recent decades. These domains are related to: 

- problems from the history of science about the abandonment of ontological commitments as old theories which are replaced by more empirically adequate ones; 

- questions arising from the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists about what really is at stake between them and about the inadequacies of constructive empiricism. 

The “semantic” or “model-theoretic” understanding of the nature of scientific representation is suggested to fit with the kind of structural realism described in this chapter. The structure of the argument presented here is dialectical. The most serious problems for constructive empiricism are explained, and van Fraassen's empiricism is supplemented with a commitment to objective modality to respond to these objections.

Chapter 3 Ontic Structural Realism and the Philosophy of Physics

The authors examine Ontic Structural Realism and its relationship with the philosophy of physics. OSR is the view that the world has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not following from the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. According to OSR, even the identity and individuality of objects depend on the relational structure of the world. In keeping with the principle of naturalistic closure, this account must not imply revision of special sciences for the sake of metaphysical comfort. The purpose of this chapter is to found OSR on contemporary fundamental physics. It argues for a position that relies on a combination of eliminating concepts of self-subsistent individuals, the view that relational structure is the foundation of metaphysical being and structural realism, i.e. that science describes the objective modal structure of the world.

Chapter 4 Rainforest Realism and the Unity of Science

This chapter requires that a metaphysical hypothesis respect the constraint of the principle of naturalistic closure (PNC). The Principle of Naturalistic Closure refers to the concept that any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously should be motivated only by the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one of which is drawn from fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses taken separately. Floridi criticises what he calls the “eliminativist” interpretation of OSR, the view that self-subsistent individuals do not exist, on the grounds that it allows the quantum-theoretic problems over entanglement to command our general worldview. However, the Primacy of Physics Constraint (PPC), according to which failure of an interpretation of special-science generalisations to respect negative implications of physical theory is grounds for rejecting such generalisations, is endorsed in this chapter.

Thus, Floridi's denying the consequent (modus tollens) may be considered a conclusion that follows logically from the premises (modus ponens): if the best current interpretation of fundamental physics says there are no self-subsistent individuals, then special sciences had better admit that for the sake of unification of an ontological interpretation, it is compatible with a non-atomistic metaphysics.

Chapter 5 Causation in a Structural World

The idea of causation has a similar status to ideas of cohesion, forces and things. Appreciating the role of causation in a notional world is crucial to understanding the nature of the special sciences and the general ways in which they differ from fundamental physics. Causation, unlike cohesion, is both a notional-world concept and a folk concept. Moreover, causation, unlike cohesion, is a basic category of traditional metaphysics. This chapter also argues that causation, just like cohesion, is a representational real pattern that is necessary for an adequately comprehensive science. It begins with an account that eliminates causation altogether on naturalistic grounds and then shows, using the principle of naturalistic closure motivations, why this outright eliminativism is too strong. The eliminativist argument to be discussed is due to Bertrand Russell, whose view has some important contemporary adherents among philosophers of physics.

Chapter 6 Conclusion—Philosophy Enough

The conclusion criticises Daniel Dennett for dividing reality into first-class illiata (conclusions) and second-class abstracta (immaterial ideas), then argues that fundamental physics directly studies extra-representational real patterns, while special sciences study real patterns located by means of the notional-world concepts of cohesion and causation. Dennett's abstracta are approximate descriptions of the illata, where the approximations in question usefully serve human purposes. By contrast, special-science real patterns are not approximations of fundamental physical real patterns. The primacy of the physics constraint is the only physicalist principle motivated by actual science, and it is too weak to support any form of reduction of special-science real patterns to physical real patterns. The special sciences often successfully track real patterns, based on the no-miracles argument (realism is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle), rather than on any claim about how the special sciences inherit ontological seriousness from their relationship to physics.

Themes

Traditional metaphysics criticised

Ladyman critiques various metaphysical positions that rely on the existence of independent objects, arguing that these views are inadequate for explaining the nature of reality as revealed by modern science.

He challenges Substance Metaphysics. This theory affirms that objects (substances) exist independently and have intrinsic properties. Ladyman argues that this view is not supported by modern physics, which often reveals that what we consider "substances" are better understood in terms of their relations and interactions.

He also criticises the idea of realism about particulars. Traditional realism holds that particular objects exist independently of our knowledge or perception of them. Ladyman critiques this view by advocating ontic structural realism, which suggests that the structure of relationships is more fundamental than the existence of individual objects.

Ladyman also disagrees with essentialism, which is the view that objects have essential properties that define their identity. Ladyman challenges this notion by arguing that properties are often context-dependent and that the identity of objects cannot be understood without considering their relational context.

Metaphysical realism is also challenged. This is the belief that there is a mind-independent reality that can be known. Ladyman questions the assumptions underlying metaphysical realism, suggesting that our understanding of reality is shaped by scientific theories and practices rather than by an independent reality of objects.

He discards naive realism, which postulates the world is as we perceive it, with objects existing independently of our perceptions. Ladyman argues that scientific findings often contradict naive realism, as they reveal a more complex and relational understanding of reality.

Ontic structural realism

Ladyman argued for ontic forms of structural realism against epistemic forms. He hypothesises that the world is fundamentally made up of structures and relations rather than individual objects. This challenges the classical view of a world composed of distinct, self-sufficient entities.

Ontic structural realism underlines the relationships and structures in which entities are embedded. It acknowledges them as more fundamental than the entities themselves. This contrasts with traditional realism, which often prioritises the existence of individual objects.

Ladyman argues that contemporary physics, particularly in areas like quantum mechanics and relativity, supports the idea that the world is best understood in terms of structures rather than individual particles or objects. The focus on symmetries and relational properties in physics agrees with this perspective.

Epistemic structural realism suggests that our knowledge of the world is fundamentally structural. Ontic structural realism goes further by claiming that the world itself is fundamentally structural. This means that the entities we talk about in science are not the primary focus, rather it is the structure that is ontologically significant.

Ontic structural realism has significant implications for metaphysics, suggesting a shift in how we think about existence and the nature of reality. It challenges the notion of substance-based metaphysics and encourages a focus on relational properties and networks of interactions. By prioritising structure over individual entities, Ontic structural realism provides a novel perspective that fits in with the relational aspects of contemporary physics, encouraging a reevaluation of traditional metaphysical assumptions.

Philosophical implications of Ontic structural realism

Traditional metaphysical views prioritise substances or individual entities. Ontic structural realism proposes that the nature of reality is not that of individual objects, but of structures and relationships. Entities have identity and properties through their relations within a structure. This leads to a relational ontology where the focus is on the interconnection between things, not on the things themselves.

Ladybird argues for a sort of scientific realism that maintains we can know the structures of the world through scientific theories, even if we cannot know the individual entities that populate those structures. The implication is that our understanding of reality is theory-based, as different scientific theories may reveal different structures. This suggests that our knowledge is dependent on the frameworks we use. As different scientific theories may describe the same underlying structure this also leads to a more unified view of science where theories are seen as different perspectives on the same reality.

The ontic structural realism approach balances the tension between reductionist ideas (which seek to explain complex phenomena in terms of simpler components) and holistic concepts (which emphasise the importance of the whole structure). Its emphasis on the role of models in science, which represent structures rather than individual entities, influences how we understand scientific representation and explanation.

The insistence on structures and relations can extend to social and ethical considerations, underlining the interconnectedness of individuals and communities, and potentially influencing views on social justice and responsibility. Ontic structural realism also raises questions about collective agency and the role of structures in shaping human behaviour, suggesting that social structures can have a profound impact on individual actions and social outcomes.